What Drives U.S. Banking Mergers: Misvaluation, Gambling or Envy? by Zhang, Wenjia
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations in Business
Administration College of Business (Strome)
Summer 2011




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zhang, Wenjia. "What Drives U.S. Banking Mergers: Misvaluation, Gambling or Envy?" (2011). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD),
dissertation, , Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/8as0-4641
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds/69
WHAT DRIVES U.S. BANKING MERGERS: MISVALUATION, 
GAMBLING OR ENVY? 
by 
Wenjia Zhang 
B.A. July 2000, Xi'an Jiaotong University, China 
M.S. July 2004, University of Science and Technology of China 
A Dissertation Submitted to the faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (FINANCE) 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
August 2011 
John A. Doukas (Director) 
MohammadnNajand (Member) 
David Selover (Member) 
ABSTRACT 
WHAT DRIVES U.S. BANKING MERGERS: 
OVERVALUATION, GAMBLING OR ENVY? 
Wenjia Zhang 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. John A. Doukas 
The thesis consists of three essays that examine whether U.S. bank mergers are 
motivated by market inefficiency and managerial psychology biases. Essay I 
investigates equity misvaluation as a possible driver for United States banking mergers 
from the perspective of market inefficiency, and finds that bidders tend to use 
overvalued equity to buy undervalued targets. Essay II, motivated by the cumulative 
prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), tests whether managerial gambling 
attitudes are linked with lottery characteristics of target banks (i.e., high skewness, high 
volatility, and low price). The evidence shows that banking acquisitions are influenced 
by gambling attitudes rooted into house money effects. Essay III examines whether 
managerial envy plays a key role in shaping merger waves. The empirical evidence 
shows that envy influences bank merger waves. 
IV 
"Man is but a reed, the feeblest thing in nature; but he is a reed that thinks. 
... Let us endeavor, then, to think well; this is the principle of morality." 
- Blaise Pascal 
This thesis is dedicated to anyone who likes critical thinking. 
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In the past more than twenty years, the U.S. banking industry experienced the 
biggest consolidation, which reduced the number of U.S. banks around a half. In the 
bank merger literature, various motivations of bidding banks have been investigated, 
including improving target operating performance, capitalization of the target firms, 
industry concentration, and deal size (Hernando et al., 2009). The thesis examines 
whether market overvaluation, managerial gambling attitude and envious psychology 
play a role in motivating the U.S. banks' merger activities. 
Essay I (Chapter II) investigates misvaluation as a possible driver for United 
States banking mergers from the perspective of market inefficiency. In an inefficient 
market, stocks are mispriced, and there is information asymmetry between inside 
managers and outside investors. Rational managers are likely to take over other firms 
using their overvalued stocks. Our empirical evidence generally supports the 
misvaluation hypothesis. Bidder and target valuations (price-to-book or 
price-to-residual income model value) are related to the method of payment, premium, 
and bidder and target announcement-period returns. This study also finds new 
evidence for the monitoring hypothesis. Acquiring private banks, which have 
relatively concentrated ownership compared with public banks, using stock increases 
bidders' wealth. Diversification effects are also tested. Consistent with Delong (2001), 
geographic and activity diversification is found to decrease bidders' wealth, as 
reflected in bidders' negative abnormal returns around the merger announcement, but 
increase targets' wealth. 
Essay II (Chapter III) investigates the asset pricing implications of the 
cumulative prospect theory in the context of U.S. bank acquisitions, with particular 
emphasis on its probability weighting component. It hypothesizes that gambling 
attitudes matter for banking takeover decisions and analyzes takeover announcements 
for public U.S. targets from 1985 to 2006. The evidence demonstrates that the offer 
price premium is higher when the target bank has characteristics similar to those of 
lottery tickets (high skewness, high volatility, and low price). In addition, target 
announcement returns are found to be higher in lottery-type acquisitions. Consistent 
with our expectations, bidder announcement returns and synergies are irrelevant to the 
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lottery characteristics of the target. The patterns we document are stronger when 
bidding firms are bigger, target firms are smaller, investor sentiment is above the 
median, and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index is negative. Consistent with the 
house money effect of Thaler and Johnson (1990), bank managers are more prone to 
readily accept risk when the pain of potential losses is cushioned by prior gains. 
Overall, the results indicate that banking acquisitions are influenced by gambling 
attitudes. 
Essay III (Chapter IV) tests whether chief executive officer (CEO) envy plays 
an important role in shaping U.S. bank merger waves. Since managerial benefits, 
especially compensation, always increase with firm size, we conjecture that bank 
CEOs easily rush into acquisitions due to their envious psychology once other bank 
CEOs initiate them. Five empirical predictions—concerning bidder (target) size, 
transaction size, value creation for the bidders, compensation increases for top 
managers, as well as total gains (synergies) from bank mergers—are made and 
generally empirically supported. We view envy as the key driving force behind these 
empirical results. 
All these analysis aim to highlight the extent to which the resolutions of U.S. 
bank mergers can be influenced by market inefficiency and managerial psychology 
biases. The empirical evidence show these factors cause different impacts on the 
decision making of U.S. banks, as well as the formulation of bank merger waves. 
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Chapter II 
Misvaluation and the United States Banking Mergers 
2.1 Introduction 
In the 1990s, the United States and world economies experienced a large wave 
of mergers and acquisitions (Andrade, 2001). The U.S. banking industry has been 
consolidating rapidly: the number of U.S. commercial banks fell from about 14,000 in 
1980 to about 7,000 by the end of 2008,1 the vast majority of this being due to 
acquisitions, rather than bank failures. Banking and financial services has consistently 
ranked in the top five of all industries in the number of merger transactions taking 
place each year. From 1980 to 2003, the share of assets held by the ten largest 
commercial banks (ranked by assets) rose from 22% to 46%, while the share of 
deposits held by the ten largest commercial banks (ranked by deposits) rose from 19% 
to41%.2 
In the bank merger literature, various motivations of bidding banks have been 
investigated, including improving target operating performance, capitalization of the 
target firms, industry concentration, and deal size (Hernando et al., 2009). But the 
recent debate about the cause of merger waves has highlighted the fact that merger 
waves are correlated with high stock market valuations (e.g., see Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003), Dong et al. (2006)). The misvaluation hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) 
holds that market inefficiency has important effects on takeover activity. Bidders 
attempt to profit by buying undervalued targets for cash at a price below fundamental 
value or by paying equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued than 
the bidders (Dong et al., 2006). A number of authors have developed models in which 
merger waves are motivated by managerial timing of bidders' market overvaluation 
(see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004), and 
corporate evidence has generally supported this view (Dong et al., 2006). However, 
evaluating the overvaluation hypothesis in the context of bank mergers has not yet 
received researchers' attention. 
The merger and acquisition model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) is based on 
stock market misvaluations of the combining firms; the model views corporate merger 
1 See the website of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (http //www2.fdic gov/SDI/SOB/) 
2 Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, various 
years. 
4 
activities as a response to market mispricing. The key ingredients of the model are the 
relative valuations of the merging firms and the market's perception of the synergies 
from the combination. Merger waves could result from managerial timing of market 
overvaluations of their firms. Managers act on the behalf of existing shareholders and 
exploit their temporary overvaluation by taking over the undervalued targets. 
Motivated by the theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Chapter I examines 
whether U.S. bank mergers are driven by market mispricing. 
In contrast to previous literature in the banking merger field, this is the first 
study to explore whether bank mergers are motivated by equity misvaluation, and 
more specifically address the following questions: Does misvaluation induce U.S. 
bank mergers while differentiating the influence of the Q hypothesis? What is the 
difference between U.S. banks acquiring public banks and private banks? How do 
geographic and activity diversification influence bank mergers, and how does the 
market evaluate such diversification activities? 
Essay I is organized as follows. Section II discusses related literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section III describes the methodology and data. Section IV 
reports univariate results regarding the misvaluation hypothesis. Section V reports 
results regarding the wealth effects of geographic and activity diversification. Section 
VI reports the multivariate results. Section VII discusses the empirical results. Section 
VIII summarizes the findings and offers conclusions. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Misvaluation-driven Mergers 
The fundamental assumption behind the theory of "stock market-driven 
acquisitions" is that the market is inefficient, and some firms are thus incorrectly 
priced. However, the theory also assumes that managers are completely rational, 
understand stock market inefficiencies, and take advantage of them, in part through 
merger decisions. The misvaluation hypothesis holds that bidders try to profit either 
by buying undervalued targets for cash at a price below fundamental value, or by 
paying equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued than the bidder. 
From the acquiring firm's perspective, stock-financed mergers can be viewed 
as two simultaneous transactions, both a merger and equity issue (Andrade et al., 
2001). Myers and Majluf (1984) assert that managers with superior information, 
acting in the best interests of old shareholders, will issue equity when the equity is 
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overpriced. Moreover, managers will pass up positive net present value investments if 
the equity necessary to finance them is sufficiently underpriced by the market. Their 
model illustrates that a firm will invest if and only if the value of its growth 
opportunity captured by the old shareholders is greater than the value of the assets in 
place that they must give up. Thus, the decision to issue equity and invest conveys 
negative information to the market about the value of the firm's assets in place. The 
model of Myers and Majluf indicates that an equity issue announcement will cause 
the firm's stock price to decline, but there will be little (no) stock price reaction to the 
announcement of risky (riskless) debt issues. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), rational managers tend to take 
advantage of the less rational market. Bidder and target misvaluation should affect 
expropriation opportunities and managerial incentives, and therefore transaction 
characteristics including the method of payment (stock versus cash), the form of the 
offer (merger versus tender offer), bid premium, hostility of the target to the offer, 
success of the bid, and event-period returns. Stock acquisition occurs when there is a 
supply of highly overvalued bidders as well as relatively fewer overvalued targets. 
When industry valuation is high, mergers are more likely to be executed with stock. 
When industry valuation is low, mergers are more often executed in cash. However, 
target overvaluation encourages target management to voluntarily accept 
expropriation offers in order to cash out. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assume that 
acquirers are overvalued, and the motive for acquisitions is not to gain synergies, but 
to preserve some of their temporary overvaluation for long-term shareholders. 
Specifically by acquiring less-overvalued targets with overvalued stock, acquirers can 
cushion the fall for their shareholders by leaving them with more hard assets per share. 
Or if the shareholders perceive the deal as synergistic, then they would overvalue the 
combined entity. In such a case, the acquirer can still enjoy a long-run cushion effect, 
while offering a large premium to the target. This model sheds light on who acquires 
whom, the mode of payment, the valuation consequence of mergers and merger 
waves. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also construct a model to manifest that 
periods of stock merger activity are correlated with high market valuations. Their 
model suggests that valuation impacts mergers and merger waves regardless of the 
underlying motivation for the mergers. Potential market value deviations from 
fundamental values on both sides of the transaction can rationally lead to a correlation 
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between stock merger activity and market valuation; merger waves and waves of cash 
and stock purchases can be rationally driven by periods of over (under)-valuation of 
the stock market. Thus, valuation fundamentally impacts mergers; cash acquirers are 
less overvalued than stock acquirers, and cash targets are undervalued relative to stock 
targets. 
To test the hypothesis that valuation errors affect merger activity, 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) decompose the market-to-book ratio (M/B) into three 
components: the firm-specific pricing deviation from short-run industry pricing; 
sector-wide, short-run deviations from firms' long-run pricing; and long-run 
value-to-book. They find strong support for the misvaluation hypothesis of 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003), which 
predicts that valuation errors affect merger activity. Specifically, equity-overvalued 
acquirers use stock to buy targets with relatively lower firm-specific error; cash 
targets are undervalued relative to stock targets; cash acquirers are less overvalued 
than stock acquirers, i.e., misvaluation affects not only who buys whom, but also the 
method of payment. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) also find that firms with 
low long-term market-to-book ratio acquire targets with higher market-to-book ratio, 
which is counter to the conventional wisdom. 
Dong et al. (2006) also test and provide evidence in support of the 
misvaluation model of mergers and acquisitions from Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
Specifically, they examine the misvaluation hypothesis (that inefficient stock market 
misvaluation is an important driver of the takeover market) and the Q hypothesis (that 
high-quality bidders improve bad targets more than bad bidders improve good targets) 
using contemporaneous measures of the valuations of bidders and targets, including 
price-to-book (P/B) and the ratio of price-to-residual income valuation (P/V). Their 
evidence is broadly consistent with both hypotheses. The results for the Q hypothesis 
appear to be stronger in the pre-1990 period than in the 1990-2000 period, whereas 
their analysis indicates that the misvaluation hypothesis gains more support during the 
1990-2000 period. 
In addition, Ang and Cheng (2006) provide direct empirical evidence that 
stock overvaluation is an important motive for firms to make stock acquisitions, 
supporting the market-driven acquisition theory of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
Specifically, Ang and Cheng (2006) find that more overvalued firms are more likely 
to acquire with stock, and mergers with more overvalued acquirers have a higher 
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probability of being completed. They assert that an opportunistic acquirer gains only 
if its overvaluation exceeds the target's overvaluation and the merger premium. 
Specifically, acquirers are, on average, more overvalued than the targets' 
premium-adjusted overvaluation, and successful acquirers are more overvalued than 
unsuccessful ones. Ang and Cheng (2006) establish that overvaluation increases the 
probability of firms becoming stock acquirers and the probability of stock mergers 
being completed, after controlling for other factors. Once the overvaluation of the 
acquirers and the rationality condition are taken into account, the acquiring 
shareholders are found to be better off than those of similarly overvalued 
non-acquirers. Overvaluation motivates acquirers try to achieve wealth transfer, 
instead of wealth creation, through mergers. Wealth transfer from target shareholders 
to acquiring shareholders or from long-term to short-term shareholders creates no new 
net wealth to the economy. Instead, this transfer incurs considerable deadweight costs, 
from investment bank fees to management time, and is socially wasteful. 
Motivated by the previous literature, especially the theoretical model of 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003), we hypothesize that inefficient stock market misvaluation 
is an important driver of the United States banks' takeover market, with the potential 
to influence takeover characteristics, such as the means of payment, the likelihood of 
offer success, and the wealth creation for bidders and targets. 
2.2.2 Monitoring Effects: Difference between Taking over Public and Private 
Banks 
According to Grossman and Hart (1980) the proper management of a common 
property is a public good to all the owners of the property, and there are significant 
costs in ensuring that directors/managers act in the interest of the owners. If the 
outsider (uninformed shareholders) can gain only on the shares he already owns 
(which are few, if any) but must pay all monitoring and takeover costs, the deal may 
not be worthwhile for him. For the same reason, small shareholders do not have a 
sufficiently large stake in the firm to absorb the costs of watching the management, 
and outsiders without a share in a diffusely held firm would never make an effort to 
improve it. If one shareholder devotes resources to improving management, then all 
shareholders benefit. 
Both Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) assert that blockholders 
can serve as effective monitors of managerial performance or facilitate takeovers, so 
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the creation of outside blockholders during mergers can increase firm value. Firms 
acquiring privately held targets through common stock exchanges tend to create 
outside blockholders, because such targets are owned by a small group of 
shareholders. Therefore, acquiring private firms is expected to increase the bidder's 
firm value. 
Jensen (1989) also asserts that diffusely held firms are worth less than ones 
with concentrated ownership. In a diffusely held corporation, no individual investor 
finds it worthwhile to engage in monitoring activities, so managers shirk. An investor 
whose wealth is concentrated in a single venture has strong incentives to monitor the 
enterprise, limiting managerial malfeasance. A monitor who owns the entire firm 
enjoys the full product of his efforts to control management. Thus, he selects the 
intensity of monitoring at which the ex ante expected marginal product of monitoring 
equals its marginal cost. 
Steven (1993) develops a model of a firm operated by a single manager and 
owned by many shareholders, showing that when monitoring is a public good whose 
costs are privately incurred, only large shareholders have incentives to monitor 
managers. The tradeoff of returns from improved monitoring against the cost of 
bearing idiosyncratic risk would determine a unique optimal ownership structure. 
Provided the returns of the firm are not too risky and the cost of monitoring is not too 
high, a concentrated ownership is best. The model predicts that stock price increases 
with the rise in concentration of stock ownership. Jensen (1989) does not explain why 
anyone would become a large shareholder while small shareholders earn identical 
returns and need not monitor. Steven (1993) provides some possible extensions to the 
analysis. While monitoring the manager, the large shareholder may get information 
about the value of the firm before other market participants. By trading on this 
information, the blockholders could earn a return that compensates them for the 
private cost they incur in obtaining it. The prospective private return could cause the 
major shareholder to increase his monitoring activities to the benefit of all 
shareholders. The free rider problem might be redressed by introducing valuable 
private information as a side product of monitoring. For the minor shareholders, their 
free riding benefit would be offset by the cost of trading against an 
information-advantaged party. 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) employ a sample of 22 industries to investigate 
the effects of large outside shareholders on corporate performance and corporate 
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financial policy. That is, they try to determine whether the presence of large 
shareholders is associated with systematic differences in expected earnings growth, 
dividend payout ratios, or leverage ratios. They suggest that management has an 
incentive to tilt earnings toward the present and that outside monitors can ameliorate 
this distortion. The empirical analysis of Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) indicates 
symbiosis in the relationship between the monitor and the monitored. 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) examine the role of large shareholders in 
monitoring managers when the managers propose antitakeover charter amendments. 
Controlling for ownership concentration among institutions, managerial ownership, 
and firm size, Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) find a statistically significant positive 
relation between institutional ownership and the stockholder wealth effects of various 
amendments proposals. This supports the "active monitoring hypothesis" proposed by 
Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), which holds that the existence of 
large shareholders leads to better monitoring of managers. 
Consequently, when bidding banks announce a takeover of private banks using 
stock, the bidding banks would create large blockholders for themselves. Because 
ownership is highly concentrated in privately held firms, merged by means of stock 
exchange, the original owners of the targets become new blockholders of the bidders 
and would actively monitor the management of the bidding banks. Therefore, 
compared to acquiring public firms, bidders of private firms are expected to create 
more wealth for their shareholders when stock is used in acquiring private firms due 
to the monitoring effects of new blockholders. On the other hand, if the transaction is 
paid in cash, no new shareholders are created for the bidders regardless of whether the 
targets are private or public firms and we would thus expect no difference between 
bidders acquiring public targets and bidders acquiring private targets. 
2.2.3 Diversification and Bank Mergers 
Economies of scale are the cost advantages that a business obtains due to 
expansion. They primarily refer to efficiencies associated with supply-side changes, 
such as increasing or decreasing the scale of its production, of a single product type 
(Panzar and Willig, 1977). Economies of scope, in contrast to economies of scale, 
refer to efficiencies primarily associated with demand-side changes, such as 
increasing or decreasing the scope of the marketing and distribution of different types 
of products. Economies of scope are one of the main reasons for marketing strategies 
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such as product bundling, product lining, and family branding (Panzar and Willig, 
1981). Economies of scale usually occur when banks takeover banks within the same 
business sector; economies of scope happen when banks takeover banks operating in 
different sectors. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, many corporations undertook massive 
diversification programs and diversification activities. This reached a climax during 
the merger wave of the late 1960s, which marked the rise to prominence of huge 
conglomerate firms (Berger, 1995). However, recent studies find that economies of 
scope began to lose its territory since the 1980s. Comment and Jarrell (1995) find a 
steady trend toward greater focus during the 1980s, and diseconomies of scope in the 
1980s are confirmed by a trend towards specialization. In 1988, 55.7% of 
exchange-listed firms had a single business segment, compared to 38.1% in 1979. 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) also find a positive relation between stock returns and 
focus increases; large focused firms were less likely to be subject to hostile takeover 
attempts than were other firms, but diversified firms in the 1980s are relatively active 
participants, as both buyers and sellers, in the market for corporate control. 
Liebeskind and Opler (1996) examine the impact of corporate restructuring on 
industry concentration, and document a modest increase in median industrial 
concentration in sample industries between 1981 and 1989. 
According to Delong (2001), banking is a special industry and geographic 
diversification in the U.S. is important because regulation at the state level influences 
not only the market for corporate control but also activities in which banks may 
engage. Delong (2001) examines the effects of both geography and activity 
diversification and asserts that the findings in other industries could not immediately 
be applied to banking. Compared with Delong (2001), we test the impact of 
diversification within the banking industry during a longer horizon, and look into 
mergers when they acquire different types of targets. 
2.2.3.1 Benefits of Diversification 
Theoretical arguments suggest that diversification has both value-enhancing 
and value-reducing effects. The potential benefits of operating different lines of 
business within one firm include greater operating efficiency, less incentive to forego 
positive net present value projects, greater debt capacity, and lower taxes (Berger and 
Ofek, 1995). 
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Chandler's The Visible Hand (1977) transcends business history to provide 
insights on how innovative firms re-draw organizational boundaries and structures for 
efficient and effective innovation. Chandler argues that because multidivisional firms 
create a level of management concerned with coordination of specialized divisions, 
they are inherently more efficient and thus more profitable than if those lines of 
business were separate. Weston (1970) asserts that resources are allocated more 
efficiently in internal capital markets than in external capital markets; diversified 
firms allocate resources more efficiently because they create a larger internal capital 
market. 
Myers (1977) points out that the underinvestment problem arises when 
stockholders lack incentives to contribute new capital to value-increasing projects 
where returns are captured mainly by bondholders. By creating a larger internal 
capital market, diversified firms can reduce this underinvestment problem. The 
internal capital market argument predicts that diversified companies carry out more 
positive net present value investments than their segments would make as separate 
firms. 
Stein (1997) examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce 
resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank lender, 
headquarters has control rights that give it both the authority and the incentive to 
engage in "winner-picking" by channeling the funds toward "winners" and away from 
"losers." Management always picks the winners and funnels resources to the projects 
that pay off more than other projects. Diversified firms have uncorrected projects 
from which to choose and thereby create value in more states (economic conditions) 
of the world than focused firms with highly correlated projects. Houston et al. (1997) 
state that by doing a good winner-picking job, "headquarters can create value even 
when its own relationship with the outside capital market is fraught with agency 
problems and it therefore cannot help at all to relax overall firm-wide credit 
constraints." Houston et al. show that bank holding companies create internal capital 
markets in order to lower the cost of capital. According to Houston et al. (1997), the 
extent to which banking firms face external financing costs when funding new loans 
greatly influences the banks' capital acquisition process, the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, and the impact of capital requirements. By examining the cash flow 
sensitivity of loan growth at bank holding companies and the extent to which bank 
holding companies establish an internal capital market to allocate capital among their 
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various subsidiaries, Houston et al. (1997) find that loan growth at subsidiary banks is 
more sensitive to the holding company's cash flow and capital position than to the 
bank's own cash flow and capital; bank loan growth is negatively correlated with loan 
growth among the other subsidiaries in the holding company. Their results suggest 
that bank holding companies find that the benefits of internal capital markets exceed 
the additional agency costs involved in coordinating actions within the holding 
company. 
Hubbard and Palia (1999) also conduct empirical tests to assess the value of 
internal capital markets. The external capital markets were relatively undeveloped 
during the 1960s, relative to the information-laden decades that followed, and internal 
capital markets served to overcome inefficient external markets. The greater the 
information asymmetries between managers and the external market, the more 
valuable the internal market. All bidders, including those engaged in diversifying 
mergers, generally earned positive abnormal returns during the 1960s. One possible 
explanation for bidding firms earning these positive abnormal returns in diversifying 
acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome 
the information deficiencies of the less-developed capital markets. 
Another potential benefit of diversification arises from combining businesses 
with imperfectly correlated earnings streams (Berger, 1995). Lewellen (1971) asserts 
that this coinsurance effect gives diversified firms greater debt capacity than 
single-line businesses of similar size; conglomerates are highly levered relative to 
their peers. Increased debt capacity could create value by increasing interest tax 
shields. Diversified firms are predicted to have higher leverage and lower tax 
payments than if their businesses were operated separately (Berger, 1995). Another 
tax advantage comes from the tax code's asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. 
Majd and Myers (1987) note that focused firms are at a significant tax disadvantage; 
firms pay taxes when they earn profits but cannot get compensated when they lose 
money. This disadvantage for single-segment firms is reduced, but not eliminated, by 
the tax code's carryback and carryforward provisions. Majd and Myers (1987) predict 
that, when one or more segments of a conglomerate experience losses in some years, a 
conglomerate pays less in taxes than its segments would pay separately. 
2.2.3.2 Costs of Diversification 
The potential costs of diversification include the use of increased discretionary 
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resources to undertake value-decreasing investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor 
segments to drain resources from better-performing segments, and misalignment of 
incentives between central and divisional managers. There is no clear prediction 
regarding the overall valuation effect of diversification (Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
Diversification can incur several costs. Stulz (1990) argues that diversified 
firms tend to invest too much (overinvest) in lines of business with poor investment 
opportunities. Jensen (1986) also asserts that managers of firms with unused 
borrowing power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake 
value-decreasing investments. Diversification programs generally fit within this 
category. Jensen's argument predicts that diversified firms invest more in negative net 
present value projects than their segments would if operated independently. 
Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) argue that a failing business cannot have 
a value below zero if operated on its own, but can have a negative value if it is part of 
a conglomerate that provides cross-subsidies. Thus, unprofitable lines of business may 
create greater value losses in conglomerates than they would as stand-alone firms. 
Myerson (1982) and Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) point out that there is 
information asymmetry costs between central management and divisional managers in 
decentralized firms, and these costs are higher in conglomerates than in focused firms, 
for the information is more dispersed within the conglomerate firm. This suggests that 
diversified firms are less profitable than their lines of business would be separately. 
Some authors distinguish between related and unrelated geographic 
diversification activities, arguing that related geographic diversifying firms perform 
better than conglomerates. Firms are considered to have conglomerate or unrelated 
businesses if they are geographically diversified into areas where no physical or 
knowledge resources are shared, other than financial (Stopford and Dunning, 1983; 
Wrigley, 1970; Rumelt, 1974). Rumelt (1974) argues that compared to unrelated 
diversification, related diversification affects value more positively, since skills and 
resources can be used in related markets. The effects of reputation and economies of 
scope arise when the joint cost of producing two or more outputs is less than the sum 
of the costs of producing each output individually (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Benefits 
from a positive reputation in an existing business and from economies of scope are 
available from related, but not from unrelated diversification (Nayyar, 1993). 
2.2.3.3 Diversification and Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) use a sample of 326 U.S. acquisitions 
14 
between 1975 and 1987 and find that bidders experience lower and predominantly 
negative announcement-period returns when they diversify. They suggest that 
managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce bidding firms' values but 
increase managerial personal benefits. However, Morck et al. (1990) do not examine 
returns to targets. Another interpretation of their results implies a value transfer from 
bidder to target shareholders in diversifying mergers, but not necessarily economic 
value destruction in such mergers (Delong, 2001). The study of Morck et al. (1990) 
therefore does not answer the question of whether diversifying mergers are 
economically undesirable. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) provide a partial answer 
regarding geographic diversification. With regards to corporate control, Cornett et al. 
(1998) find that corporate governance mechanisms that reduce the 
manager-shareholder conflict are not as effective in diversifying (interstate or activity) 
acquisitions as they are in focusing (interstate or activity) acquisitions. These 
diversified acquisitions are therefore less likely to be value maximizing, and 
shareholders and bank regulatory agencies should therefore be more wary of interstate 
or activity-diversifying acquisitions. 
On the other hand, intrastate bank mergers, which are subjected to few or no 
restrictions, do not destroy bidder value (Delong, 2001). Palia (1993) examine state 
regulation of acquirer and target banks in a geographically dispersed population, 
allowing the effects of a varied state regulatory menu to be assessed. This study finds 
merger premiums to be related to the characteristics of both acquirer and target banks, 
as well as the regulatory environments in both acquirer and target bank states. States 
with restricted branching make the targets more appealing, and therefore increase the 
premium, while states that allow multibank holding companies increase the number of 
bidders and also increase the premium. Location of a bank influences not only the 
market for corporate control, but also the characteristics of a bank's assets. A bank's 
loan portfolio is greatly influenced by local regulations, as some states allow their 
banks to engage in underwriting securities and insurance while other states ban such 
activities. Different regulatory environments therefore influence business decisions. 
With unregulated firms, business decisions are based on profit maximization. 
Moreover, focusing on the banking industry provides a control for 
industry-specific factors. If any inter-industry effects exist, studying intra-industry 
mergers minimizes this impact. Dealing with different industries at the same time may 
result from some industries' tendency to engage in a value-maximizing type of merger, 
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while other industries engage in a non-value-maximizing type of merger. In our study, 
we focus on United States banking industry. And we hypothesize that the market can 
distinguish activity focus from activity diversification, as well as geographic focus 
from geographic diversification, and may react differently when a merger is focused 
both in terms of activity and geography. 
Overall, the previous literature, reviewed in Section II, provides the basis for 
how to extend our understanding of banking merger behaviors. In the following 
sections, we conduct an in-depth empirical study from these three viewpoints, with an 
emphasis on the misvaluation hypothesis. 
2.3 Methodology and Data 
2.3.1 Measures of Overvaluation 
To address the question whether bank mergers are motivated by stock market 
mispricing, it requires an appropriate misvaluation measure. However, there is no 
consensus in the empirical research as to how the misvaluation of a stock should be 
measured (Ang and Cheng, 2006). Dong et al. (2006) employ two empirical proxies in 
their study: the price-to-book ratio of equity (hereafter P/B) and the price-to-residual 
income value derived from the model of Ohlson (1995) (hereafter P/V). Although B 
and V are both proxies for fundamental value, residual income value (V) contains 
forward-looking information, namely, analysts' forecasts of future earnings. P/V 
filters out the extraneous information about growth and managerial agency problems 
much better than P/B (Dong et al., 2006). P/V tends to be a relatively focused measure 
of misvaluation, and is used by several authors for this purpose, including Frankel and 
Lee (1998), Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), 
D'Mello and Shroff (2000), and Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2010). 
To avoid the controversy associated with the P/B ratio as a misvaluation 
measure (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)), we use P/V as the only 
measurement of misvaluation. We use P/B value 2 years before a merger to capture 
the growth prospects of merging banks. The use of P/B value near the acquisition 
announcement is more likely to reflect the market's misvaluation. 
2.3.1.1 P/V Based on the Three-period Forecast Horizon Residual Income Model 
According to Dong et al. (2006) and Ohlson (1995), the intrinsic value of a 
3 When we use the P/B value one year before the merger, we get similar results. 
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stock includes two parts: the book value of equity and the present value of its 
forecasted excess income. Excess income is based on analysts' forecasts of future 
earnings prospects. For each stock in month t, its intrinsic value is expressed as: 
V(t) = B(t) + Y^ 
Et[{ROE(t + 0 - re(t)}B(t + i - 1)] 
,=1 [l + re(t)Y 
where Et is the expectations operator, B(t) is the book value at time t (only positive 
B(t) observations are kept), ROE(t+i) is the return on equity for period t+i, and re(t) 
is the firm's annualized cost of equity capital. For practical purposes, we follow Dong 
et al. (2006) and Lee et al. (1999) and adopt a three-period forecast horizon: 
ur^ o ^ , UR0Ed + V ~ re W ] 5 ( t ) , [fR0E(t + 2) - re(t)]B(t + 1) 
V(t) — B(t) H p-r r • 
+ 
l + re(t) [l + r e ( t ) ]
2 
[fROE(t + 3)-re(t)]B(t + 2) 
[l + r e( t)]
2r e( t) 
where fR0E(t + i) is the forecasted return on equity for period t+i, the length of a 
period is 1 year, and the last term discounts the period t+3 residual income as a 
perpetuity. 
Forecasted ROEs are calculated as: 
?ROEr- • -^ > y J 
B(t + i - 1) 
where 
B(t + i-l) + B(t + i-2) 
B(t + i-l)= — ^ — i J-
and fEPS{t + i) is the forecasted earnings per share (EPS) for period t+i obtained 
from I/B/E/S. Future book value of equity is computed as: 
B(t + Q = B(t + i-l) + (l- k)fEPS(t + i) 
where k is the dividend payout ratio k — —. Following Lee et al. (1999), we 
EPS\t) 
delete observations where k > 1. 
The annualized cost of equity, re(i), is determined as a firm-specific rate 
using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), where the time-; beta is estimated 
using the trailing 3 years of monthly return data. 
2.3.1.2 P/V Based on the Perpetual Residual Income Model 
Similar to the residual income model of Dong et al. (2006) and Ohlson (1995), 
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another measurement of intrinsic value is constructed, which does not rely on analysts' 
forecasts of future earnings prospects. This is mainly motivated by two reasons. First, 
it permits the estimation of intrinsic values for a considerably larger sample of banks. 
Second, it can be used as a robustness check in testing the overvaluation hypothesis. 
The actual EPS(t) is used as the perpetual income of the firm, and the retained 
earnings EPS(t) * (1 — k) is treated as the excess income of the firm. The intrinsic 
value is expressed as: 
V = B ( t ) + ^ , 
where k is the dividend payout ratio k = —. Following Lee et al. (1999), we 
EPS(t) 
delete observations where k > 1. (re(t)) is the annualized cost of equity, determined as 
a firm-specific rate using the CAPM, where the time-; beta is estimated using the 
trailing 3 years of monthly return data. 
To verify the robustness of our main findings, we also use the alternative 
constant discount rate of 12.5% (following Dong et al. (2006) and D'Mello and Shroff 
(2000)) for both measures. Both P/B (2 years before) and P/V ratios are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% tails. Higher (lower) values of P/B (2 years before) indicate higher 
(lower) growth prospects while higher (lower) P/V values represent relative 
overvaluation (undervaluation). Previous studies have reported that the predictive 
ability of P/V is robust to the cost of capital used in the model (Lee et al., 1999; Dong 
et al., 2006) and to whether the discount rate is allowed to vary across firms (D'Mello 
and Shroff, 2000). 
2.3.2 Announcement-period Returns Using Event Study 
Event study is a statistical method used to assess the impact of public 
announcements of new value-relevant information. The basic idea is to find the 
abnormal return that can be attributed to the event being studied, based on the return 
that stems from the price fluctuation of the market as a whole (Gilson and Black, 
1995). According to MacKinlay (1997), event study is a "valuable and widely used 
tool in economics and finance" (p. 38), and has been used in a wide variety of studies, 
including mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, debt or equity issues, 
corporate reorganizations, investment decisions, and corporate social responsibility 
(MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). 
Abnormal return is obtained by subtracting the normal or expected return in 
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the absence of the event, ARlt = Rlt — E(Rlt), from the actual return in the event 
period. There are several ways to measure the expected return, E(Rlt). The 
frequently used benchmarks for expected returns include the returns predicted by the 
market model, market returns, and firm-specific average returns from the past period. 
Among these, the market model is likely the most frequently used approach (Kallunki 
et al., 2002). The market model is implemented in the present study, and is expressed 
as follows: 
Rlt = aL + ntRmt + elt, where t = -274, ..., -20 
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equal-weighted return is used as 
the market return, and the market model parameters are estimated over the 255-day 
period from event day -274 to event day -20. Rit is the rate of stock return for firm i 
on day t, Rmt is the market index rate of return on day t, and slt is an error term. 
Thus, the abnormal returns are calculated from actual returns during the event period 
and the estimated coefficients from the estimated period: 
ARlt = Rit - a, - faRnt, where t = -10, ..., +10 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are also calculated during different event 
windows, encompassed by event days (-n, +ri), where event day 0 is the acquisition 
announcement date. 
We also estimate long-term abnormal returns based on the Fama and French 
3-factor model with an estimation period of 5 years: 
R}t = a + BjRmt + SjSMBt + h}HMLt + eJt 
The monthly abnormal return for the common stock of the j t h firm on month t is 
given by: 
ARJt = Rjt - (aj + pjRmt + SjSMBt + h,HMLt) 
The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) are analogous to those defined in 
the market model. 
2.3.3 Data 
The sample data on U.S. bank takeover bids are obtained from Thomson ONE 
Banker Database between 1985 and 2006. The sample period ends at the end of 2006 
in order to assess the performance of bidders 2 years after the merger announcements. 
The sample originally included 2,148 complete deals, of which the bidding firms' 
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stocks are traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, with CRSP data available 
around the announcement. Each offer is announced between January 1, 1985 and 
December 31, 2006. Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the annual breakdown of the sample 
by method of payment, type of target bank, geographic diversification (cross-state). It 
also reports the nominal and inflation-adjusted average deal value (2005 as the base 
year) and the market value of bidders and market value of targets by calendar year. 
Panel B of Table 2.1 classifies the mergers by method of payment, type of target bank, 
geographic diversification (cross-state), and activity diversification and reports the 
median deal size of each type. 
Panel A shows that the number of bank merger transactions peaks in the 1990s, 
with 67%o of the transactions taking place during 1993-2000. Merger activity is 
somewhat subdued in the early 1980s and early 2000s. The average transaction value 
also peaks in late 1990s. The average market value of target banks is about five times 
smaller than the average market value of bidders. About half of the bank mergers, as 
shown in Panel B, are paid with stock, more than half of the mergers aim at public 
targets, and one-third of the mergers cross state boarders. Among all the U.S. bank 
mergers, more than half are characterized as geographic and activity focused, 1286 
deals. 
2.4 Misvaluation Hypothesis: Univariate Results 
This section reports univariate results on the relation between the two 
valuation measures and takeover characteristics. Accounting data for calculating book 
value, payout ratio and earning per share are taken from Compustat. Earnings 
forecasts for calculating the residual income intrinsic values are obtained from I/B/E/S^ 
To maintain sample size, we do not exclude a transaction from the overall sample if 
accounting or I/B/E/S data items are missing. 
2.4.1 General Empirical Results 
As discussed earlier, the misvaluation hypothesis predicts that rational 
managers understand stock market inefficiencies, and take advantage of them by 
merger activities. The models of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) predict that overvalued firms use stock to buy relatively 
undervalued target firms; cash targets are more undervalued than stock targets; cash 
acquirers are less overvalued than stock acquirers. 
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Table 2.2 reports how the two valuation measures are related to the type of 
target (public vs. private) and method of payment used. The evidence reported in 
Table 2.2 appears to be consistent with the prediction of the misvaluation hypothesis. 
Panel A reports mean values of P/B (2 years before) and P/V calculated using the 
three-period forecast horizon residual income model, and their differences between 
acquirer and target banks, and across method of payment. Panel B reports the results 
based on P/B (2 years before) and P/V values calculated using the perpetual residual 
income model. 
From the entire sample (All), the mean values of P/B (2 years before) and P/V 
ratios, in Panel A of Table 2.2, indicate that acquiring banks have higher relative 
valuation ratios than their public targets. Specifically, the average P/B (2 years 
before), P/V (k=12.5%) and P/V ratios for acquirers are 3.55, 5.56 and 6.23, and 2.42, 
3.64 and 6.17 for target banks, respectively. For the 198 transactions for which we are 
able to calculate the misvaluation measures, the acquirer-target P/V (k=12.5%) and 
P/V ratio differences are 1.92 and 0.06, respectively, statistically significant when the 
cost of equity is estimated using the constant discount rate of 12.5% (column (1) - (2)). 
Hence, the evidence, based on the entire sample, suggests that overvalued banks tend 
to acquire public banks that are less overvalued than they are. In addition, bidders 
with higher growth prospects tend to acquire targets with lower growth prospects. 
Interestingly, bidders purchasing private targets are more overvalued than their peers 
acquiring public targets. The average P/V (k=12.5%) and P/V ratios for acquirers of 
public targets are 5.56 and 6.23, whereas the corresponding relative valuation ratios 
for acquirers of private banks are 7.54 and 9.68, respectively. The growth prospects of 
bidders buying public versus private banks, as revealed by the P/B (2 years before) 
ratio, do not seem to be dramatically different. 
Bidder valuations tend to exceed public target valuations significantly in 
equity offers but not in cash offers. For the 137 cash transactions for which P/V can 
be calculated, the bidder-target P/V (k=12.5%) and P/V differentials are 1.34, and 
-1.1, respectively4 (only marginally significant for P/V where A=12.5%). Among the 
61 stock offers with data available, the bidder-target P/B (2 years before), P/V 
(k=12.5%) and P/V differential is 2.55, 2.31 and 3.19, respectively (all three measures 
4 The big sample size reduction caused by IBES database availability is likely to influence the consistent of 
empirical result. So, we also use the constructed perpetual model to estimate the intrinsic values (see Panel B of 
Table II) and provide better result. 
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are highly significant). For stock payment deals, the P/B (2 years before), P/V 
(k=12.5%) and P/V differentials between bidders acquiring public targets and private 
targets are 0.15, -1.67, and -2.26, respectively (both P/V measures are highly 
significant). As shown earlier for the full sample, the bidders who are acquiring 
private targets with stock or cash are consistently more overvalued than their peer 
banks acquiring public targets. 
Consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis, which postulates that cash 
acquirers are less overvalued than stock acquires, the results show that equity offers 
are associated with higher bidder valuations than cash offers, and the bidder-target 
difference in valuation is, on average, greater among equity offers than cash offers. 
Columns (5) and (6) show that for all three relative valuation measures, bidders using 
stock payment to acquire public targets have significantly higher growth 
prospect/valuation than bidders using cash payment, with P/B (2 years before), P/V 
(k=12.5%) and P/V differentials of 1.75, 1.04 and 2.3. Similarly, column (7) shows 
that for all three relative valuation measures, the bidders offering equity to acquire 
private targets also have higher growth prospect/valuation than bidders offering cash, 
with P/B (2 years before), P/V (k= 12.5%) and P/V differentials of 3.55, 1.18 and 1.06. 
These results are consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis, which predicts that 
highly overvalued bidders are more likely to use stock payment. Comparing bidder 
valuations for the entire sample, the evidence in column (8) indicates that bidders 
offering cash have significantly lower growth prospects than their bidder peers 
offering stock; the P/B (2 years before) ratio is 4.56 for stock offers and 2.26 for cash 
offers, with a mean difference of 2.3 (statistically significant at the 1% level). 
Similarly, P/V (k=12.5%) is 5.71 for cash versus 7.31 for stock, and P/V is 6.54 for 
cash versus 9.21 for stock (both differences are statistically significant). This suggests 
that stock acquirers are overvalued firms, confirming the prediction of the 
overvaluation hypothesis, which postulates that overvalued bidders are more likely to 
use overvalued equity than cash in acquiring targets. Furthermore, for all three 
relative valuation measures, the mean valuation difference between bidders and 
targets is significantly larger in equity offers than cash offers (p < 0.01; tests not 
reported, but available upon request). 
We replicate the previous analysis using our second relative valuation measure: 
a P/V ratio based on the perpetual residual income model. The results for this 
considerably larger sample are reported in Panel B of Table 2.2, and are consistent 
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with those reported thus far. 
Overall, regardless of which relative valuation measured is used, the evidence 
is consistent with the prediction of the overvaluation hypothesis that overvalued 
bidders use stock to buy relatively undervalued targets. 
2.4.2 Effects of Target Valuations 
In this section, we examine the link between pre-offer valuation measures of 
targets and bidders to the characteristics of the takeover. Panels A and B of Table 2.3 
report the relation between target valuations and takeover characteristics. The results 
in Panel B1 are based on the estimation of the P/V ratio (intrinsic value) using the 
three-period forecast horizon residual model. Panel B2 contains results based on the 
estimation of the P/V ratio using the perpetual residual model. Panels C and D 
describe the relation between acquirer valuations and takeover characteristics. As 
before, Panel D1 reports results based on the estimation of the P/V ratio using the 
three-period forecast horizon residual model. Panel D2 provides evidence results 
based on the estimation of the P/V ratio using the perpetual residual model. For all 
deals with data available, bidders and targets in each month are ranked based on their 
respective valuation ratios and quintile groups are formed. The monthly sorting 
process ensures that any effects we detect are cross-sectional, and thus not influenced 
by time-series fluctuations in valuation and takeover characteristics. Quintile 5, the 
top valuation quintile, has the highest bidder and target P/B (2 years before) and P/V; 
quintile 1 represents the lowest valuation ratios. We also report differences across the 
top and bottom valuation quintiles (5 - 1) to illustrate whether higher market 
valuations are related to transaction characteristics. 
Due to the effects of severe sample size reduction, caused by IBES database 
availability in estimating intrinsic value based on the three-period forecast horizon 
residual income model, the results reported in Panels Bl and D2 are not offered to 
make meaningful inferences. Therefore, we will focus on discussing the empirical 
results reported in Panels B2 and D2 that rely on intrinsic value (V) estimates 
obtained from the perpetual residual income model. 
As shown in Panel A, targets with higher growth prospects, measured by P/B 
(2 years before) ratio, are more likely to be associated with stock offers. Specifically, 
the mean difference in the probability of using stock between high and low growth 
targets is 18.34%. Interestingly, high growth targets realize a much smaller bid 
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premium than their peers with low growth prospects with a mean 5-1 quintile 
difference of -48.46% (statistically significant at the 1% level). Since overvalued 
bidders use stock, this finding provides additional support for the view that bidders 
using stock are not buying targets with growth prospects. Furthermore, targets with 
low growth prospects appear to realize higher abnormal returns than high growth 
targets. The quintile difference for target announcement-period returns is -5.63% 
(significant at the 5% level for P/B (2 years before)). The results in Panel B2 
demonstrate that overvalued targets are consummated with stock offers. The 5-1 
quintile difference in the probability of using stock is 13.24% (highly statistically 
significant). As before, bidders pay a considerably larger premium for undervalued 
targets and the later realize larger cumulative announcement-period abnormal returns. 
The quintile difference for the bid premium is -12.92% (significant at the 1% level for 
P/V) and for the target announcement-period returns is -6.39% (significant at the 1% 
for P/V), respectively. This is consistent with the finding of Walkling and Edmister 
(1985) that relatively lower-valued firms command significantly higher bid premiums. 
In general, these results provide supplemental support for the overvaluation 
hypothesis. 
2.4.3 Effects of Bidder Valuations 
The relation between bidder valuations and takeover characteristics are 
described in Panels C and D of Table 2.3. First, these results indicate that higher 
bidder valuations are associated with greater use of equity and less use of cash as a 
means of payment. The differences in the probability of using stock between the top 
and bottom bidder valuation quintiles are 74.77% (P/B (2 years before)) and 46.69% 
(P/V) (both significant at the 1% level). 
Second, higher bidder valuation is associated with higher bid premium. Using 
the P/B (2 years before) measure in Panel C, the 5-1 quintile difference in premium is 
26.61% for the entire sample (significant at the 1% level). Using the P/V measure in 
Panel D2, the quintile difference in premium is 11.76% for the entire sample 
(significant at the 1% level). Hence, the evidence suggests that acquirers with high 
valuations pay higher bid premiums. 
Third, a higher prospect for bidder growth is associated with higher target 
stock returns. Specifically, in Panel C, the P/B (2 years before) quintile difference in 
target announcement-period stock returns is 10.18% for the entire sample (significant 
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at the 1% level). However, prior studies (i.e., Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991)), 
indicate that (depending on subsequent offer success), there is no significant relation 
between bidder Q and target announcement return. In Panel Dl, higher P/V is also 
associated with higher target announcement-period returns. The difference between 
the top and bottom target valuation quintiles is 4.80%) (significant at the 1% level). 
Fourth, higher bidder valuation is associated with lower bidder 
announcement-period returns. The mean acquirer announcement-period returns are 
significantly lower when the acquirer has a high valuation, based on either P/B (2 
years before) or P/V. The mean quintile differences in bidder abnormal returns around 
offer announcements are -1.71%o (sorted by P/B (2 years before)) and -1.65% (sorted 
by P/V in Panel Dl), both significant at the 1% level. A similar pattern emerges in 
Panel D2 for a larger sample of bidders. 
Moreover, the evidence in Panels C and D of Table 2.3 indicates that 
overvalued bidders are less (more) likely to successfully merge with public (private) 
targets. The quintile difference in the probability of merging with public targets is 
-42.53%) (P/V) (significant at the 1% level). This difference results primarily from 
equity offers (see Table 2.2), where the valuation of bidders (for all three measures) 
targeting public banks (column (1)) is significantly lower than the valuation of bidders 
targeting private targets (column (3)). Hence, bidding banks with higher valuations 
are more likely to engage in acquisitions of private banks than public banks. 
2.4.4. Short-term Announcement Returns 
In this section we focus on the market's reaction to bank merger 
announcements. Table 2.4 reports announcement returns for private and public targets 
executed with different methods of payment. Panels Al and A2 of Table 2.4 show the 
wealth effects for deals settled with stock payment while Panels B1 and B2 show the 
wealth effects for deals completed with cash payment. 
First, merger announcements for deals with equity payment cause the bidders' 
stock price to decline when they merge with public targets, but there is no negative 
impact on the bidders' stock price when they merge with private targets. For equity 
deals, the average abnormal return (AAR) on the announcement day (t=0) for bidders 
is -1.36% when they acquire public targets (significantly negative at the 1% level).5 
5Among the 492 announcements, not reported but available upon request, 335 are negative suggesting that this 
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Column (3) in Panel Al shows that the bidders' AAR on the announcement day is 
0.06%) when they acquire private targets with stock (not significantly different from 
zero). The difference between the AAR of bidders acquiring public targets versus 
private targets (column (1) - (3) in Panel Al) is -1.42% (significantly negative at the 1% 
level). Panel A2 shows a similar pattern for the 3- and 5-day window intervals. These 
results appear to support the monitoring hypothesis, which predicts that acquirers of 
private banks using stock benefit from the concentrated ownership of targets because 
private targets are owned by a small group of shareholders who are expected to exert 
monitoring on bidders (Demsetz (1983); Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). 
Second, merger announcements for deals with equity payment cause the 
target's stock price to increase; the abnormal return of the targets is higher than that of 
the bidders in these deals. For deals with equity payment, the AAR on the 
announcement day for public targets is 9.13% (significantly positive at the 1% level); 
in unreported results, 362 of 492 announcements are positive. On the announcement 
day, the difference between the AAR of the bidders and the targets (column (1) - (2) 
in Panel Al) is -10.49% (significantly negative at the 1% level), indicating that the 
market recognizes the potential monitoring power of targets. Panels A2 provides 
similar evidence for the 3- and 5-day window intervals. 
Third, merger announcements for cash deals cause bidders' stock price to 
increase when they acquire public targets, but there is no significant influence on the 
bidders' stock price when they acquire private targets. As reported in Panel Bl (see 
column (1)), the AAR on the announcement day for bidders is 1.04%o when they 
acquire public targets (significantly positive at the 1%> level); among the 877 
announcements, 537 are positive. Column (3) shows that the AAR on the 
announcement day for the bidders is 0.22% when they acquire private targets (not 
significantly different from zero). The difference between the AAR of bidders for 
public targets and private targets (column (1) - (3) in Panel Bl) is 0.82% 
(significantly positive at the 1% level). These patterns hold for the 3- and 5-day 
window intervals (see Panel B2). 
Moreover, merger announcements for deals with cash payment cause the 
target's stock price to increase; the stock return of the targets is higher than that of the 
bidders. As shown in column (2) of Panel A, for deals executed using cash payment, 
result is not driven by outliers. 
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the AAR on the announcement day for public targets is 2.82% (significantly positive 
at the 1%> level); among the 877 announcements, 584 are positive. On the 
announcement day, the difference between the AAR of the bidders and the targets 
(column (1) - (2) in Panel Bl) is -1.78% (significantly negative at the 1% level). We 
observe similar results for the 3- and 5-day window intervals (see Panel B2). For 
example, the difference between the CAARs of bidders buying public versus private 
targets over the (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) interval period (column (1) - (3)) are 1.38% and 
1.66%) (both significantly positive at the 1% level). 
Overall, the evidence from Table 2.4 suggests that stock bidders experience 
negative abnormal returns when they acquire public targets, but do not realize losses 
when they purchase private targets. Compared with cash bidders of public targets, 
cash bidders of private targets do not realize higher returns, suggesting that, in the 
absence of additional monitoring, illiquidity plays a role in affecting the bidder's 
shareholder value. 
2.4.5 Post-acquisition Performance 
Because stock is more likely to be utilized as the method of payment in 
mergers when the bidders' valuations are high (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)) and 
merged banks will eventually face price corrections from their elevated levels (Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998); Loughran and Vijh (1997); Ang and Cheng (2003)), it is 
expected that bidders will experience negative long-run returns in stock acquisitions, 
and positive returns in cash acquisitions. 
Table 2.5 reports the long-term post-acquisition performance of the bidders, 
measured by long-term CAAR using the market model and Fama and French (1993) 
3-factor model. Panels Al and A2 of Table 2.5 report the long-term performance of 
bidders associated with stock acquisitions. The results based on the market model 
appear in Panel Al. The 2-year CAAR for bidders acquiring public targets with stock 
is -0.50%), and the 2-year CAAR for bidders buying private targets is -6.96%o. The 
results based on the Fama and French 3-factor model appear in Panel A2. The 2-year 
CAAR for bidders purchasing public targets with stock is -1.83%, and the 2-year 
CAAR for bidders buying private targets with stock is -6.37% (both significantly 
negative). Jointly, acquisitions of private banks appear to destroy more bidder 
shareholder value than acquisitions of public banks. Taking into account that bidders' 
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performance 1 year prior to such acquisitions was positive and statistically significant 
indicates that the value loss to shareholders of acquiring banks is substantial. 
Panel Bl and B2 report the long-term performance of bidders executing a 
merger with cash payment. The results based on the market model, shown in Panel B1, 
indicate that the 2-year CAAR for bidders buying public targets with cash is 0.80%o, 
and the 2-year CAAR for bidders acquiring private targets with cash is 2.76%. The 
results based on the Fama and French 3-factor model, shown in Panel B2, indicate 
that the 2-year CAAR for bidders purchasing public targets with cash is 2.98%, and 
the 2-year CAAR for bidders buying private targets with cash is 3.40% (both 
significantly positive). 
Overall, consistent with the predictions of the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
overvaluation model, the long-term post-acquisition performance of stock bidders is 
significantly negative, but significantly positive for cash bidders. 
2.5 Diversification: Univariate Test 
This section reports empirical results from examining the wealth effects of 
bank diversification arising from bank mergers. We consider two types of bank 
diversification transactions: geographic diversification and activity diversification. 
When the bidding bank targets a bank in another state, it is defined as a geographic 
diversification deal; otherwise, it is considered a geographic focus deal. We classify 
the activity diversification according to four-digit SIC codes. If the first three digits of 
the bidder's SIC code is the same as the target's SIC code, it is defined as a focus deal; 
otherwise, it is considered as a diversification deal. 
2.5.1 Effects of Geographic Diversification 
The wealth effects of geographic diversification in response to bank merger 
announcements are shown in Table 2.6. The market reaction around the merger 
announcements is measured by CAAR(-1, +1). 
First, geographically focusing deals, in which both bidder and target are within 
the same state, create more wealth for bidders than geographically diversifying deals; 
geographically diversifying deals, in which bidder and target are from different states, 
create more wealth for targets than geographically focusing deals. The combined 
wealth effect of geographically focusing deals is lower than that of geographically 
diversifying deals. For the entire sample of 2,148 deals, as shown in Panel A of Table 
28 
2.6, the 3-day CAAR around the announcement day for the bidders is 0.81%o when 
they acquire targets in the same state, and -0.82% when they acquire targets in a 
different state. The difference is 1.63% and significant at the 1% level. The CAAR (-1, 
+1) around the announcement day for the targets is 6.29% in geographically focusing 
deals, and 15.00%> in geographically diversifying deals. The difference is -8.71% and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, geographically focusing deals 
create 7.32% wealth around the 3-day announcement period for the merger partners. 
Geographically diversifying deals create 13.00%> wealth for the merger partners. This 
represents a difference of -5.68%> (significantly negative at the 1% level), suggesting 
that geographic diversification is more rewarding. 
Second, for the deals where bidders target public banks, Panel B of Table 2.6, 
geographically focusing deals, in which bidders and targets operate in the same state, 
create more wealth for the bidders. Geographically diversifying deals, in which bidder 
and target are in different states, create more wealth for the targets. The combined 
return of geographically focusing deals is lower than that of geographically 
diversifying deals. For the 1,369 deals targeting public banks, the 3-day CAAR of the 
bidders is 1.01% when they acquire targets in the same state, whereas -1.69% when 
they acquire targets in a different state. The difference is 2.70% (significantly positive 
at the 1% level). The CAAR(-1, +1) around the announcement day for the targets is 
6.15%o in geographically focusing deals, and 15.02% in geographically diversifying 
deals. This represents a difference of -8.87%o (significantly negative at the 1% level). 
The geographically focusing deals create 7.20% wealth around the announcement for 
the merger partners, and geographically diversifying deals create 13.27% wealth for 
the merger partners. This represents a difference of -6.07%> (significantly negative at 
the 1% level). 
Third, for banks targeting private ones, Panel C of Table 2.6, geographically 
focusing deals, in which bidder and target are within the same state, tend to create 
more wealth for the bidders. For the 779 banks targeting private banks, Panel C of 
Table 2.6, the CAAR(-1, +1) around the announcement day for bidders is 0.33%> 
when they acquire targets in the same state, and -0.01% when they acquire targets in a 
different state. 
Finally, geographically focusing deals create more wealth for the bidders 
when they acquire public than private banks (see Panel C of Table 2.6). However, 
geographically diversifying deals create less wealth for the bidders when they acquire 
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public than private banks. For the 1,485 geographically focusing deals, the bidders for 
the 1,051 deals that target public banks realize a CAAR(-1,+1) of 1.01%, significantly 
higher than the CAAR of bidders targeting private banks. The difference is 0.68%> and 
significant at the 1% level. Among the 663 geographically diversifying deals, the 
bidders in the 318 deals that target public banks have a CAAR(-1,+1) of -1.69%, 
significantly lower than the CAAR of bidders targeting private banks. The difference 
is -1.68% and significant at the 1% level. 
Overall, the evidence demonstrates that acquiring banks realize greater 
abnormal returns when they expand their operations within the same state rather than 
when they acquire public or private targets in a different state. Targets reap positive 
abnormal returns in mergers with bidders from the same state and from different 
states, with higher returns in geographically diversified mergers, suggesting that 
bidders tend to overpay targets located outside their geographical domain. 
2.5.2 Effects of Activity (Business) Diversification 
Now we turn to activity (business) diversification. The effects of activity 
diversification on the wealth effects of the merger announcements are reported in 
Table 2.7. 
First, for the entire sample, as shown in Panel A of Table 2.7, 
activity-focusing deals, in which the bidder and target have the same first three digits 
in their SIC codes, create more wealth for the bidders. However, activity-diversifying 
deals, in which the bidder and target do not share the same first three digits of their 
SIC codes, create more wealth for the targets. The combined wealth effect of 
activity-focusing deals is lower than that of geographically diversifying deals. For the 
entire sample of 2,148 deals, the CAAR (-1, +1) around the announcement day for the 
bidders is 0.48% for activity-focusing deals, and -0.59%o for activity-diversifying 
deals. The difference is 1.07% (significant at the 1% level). The CAAR (-1, +1) 
around the announcement day for the targets is 6.83% in activity-focusing deals, and 
16.17%) in activity-diversifying deals. The difference is -9.34% (significantly negative 
at the 1% level). Activity-focusing deals (column (1)) create wealth of 7.53% around 
the announcement for the merging partners. Activity-diversifying deals create wealth 
of 15.07% for the merging partners. This represents a difference of -7.54% 
(significantly negative at the 1%> level). 
Second, for deals targeting public firms, Panel B of Table 2.7, 
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activity-focusing deals create more wealth for the bidders while activity-diversifying 
deals create more wealth for the targets. The combined return of activity-focusing 
deals is lower than that of activity-diversifying deals. For the 1,369 deals targeting 
public banks, the CAAR(-1, +1) around the announcement day for the bidders is 0.67%> 
when they acquire targets involved in similar business and -1.13% when they acquire 
targets involved in different business. The difference is 1.80% and significant at the 1%> 
level. The CAAR(-1, +1) around the announcement day for targets is 6.70%> in 
activity-focusing deals, and 16.08% in activity-diversifying deals. This represents a 
difference of-9.38%) and significant at the 1%> level. Activity-focusing deals create 
7.40% wealth around the announcement for both parties while activity-diversifying 
deals create 8.56% wealth, with a difference of-7.59% and significant at the 1%> level. 
Finally, we turn our focus on the wealth effects associated with public and 
private targets. As shown in Panel C of Table 2.7, activity-focusing deals create more 
wealth for the bidders when they acquire public banks than when they acquire private 
banks. Activity-diversifying deals create less wealth for the bidders when they acquire 
public banks than when they acquire private banks. For the 1,806 activity-focusing 
deals, the bidders in the 1,150 deals targeting public banks have a CAAR(-1, +1) of 
0.67%, significantly higher than the CAAR(-1, +1) of bidders targeting 656 private 
banks, 0.14%o. Among the 342 activity-diversifying deals, the bidders of the 219 deals 
targeting public banks have a CAAR(-1, +1) of-1.13%, significantly lower than the 
CAAR(-1, +1) of bidders targeting private banks, 0.37%. 
2.5.3 Combination Effects of Geographic and Activity Diversification 
The joint wealth effects of geographic and activity diversification around 
merger announcements are shown in Table 2.8. Following Delong (2001), the entire 
sample is divided into four mutually exclusive categories: mergers with geographic 
and activity focus, mergers with geographic focus and activity diversification, 
mergers with geographic diversification and activity, and mergers that are associated 
with geographic and activity diversification. 
Deals involving both activity and geographic focus create more wealth for the 
shareholders of bidders than the other three groups: geographically focusing and 
activity-diversifying deals, geographically diversifying and activity-focusing deals, 
and geographically and activity-diversifying deals. Deals involving both activity and 
geographic focus create less wealth for the targets than the other three groups, 
31 
whereas deals involving both activity and geographic diversification create the most 
wealth for the targets. For the entire sample of 2,148 deals (column (5) of Panel A of 
Table 2.8), the CAAR(-1, +1) of the bidders is 1.01% for the activity and geographic 
focus group, but negative for each of the other three groups (significant differences 
shown in column (5) of Panel B). The CAAR(-1, +1) of the targets is 5.14% for the 
activity and geographic focus group, much smaller than that of the other three groups 
(shown in column (8) of Panel A of Table 2.8). 
Deals associated with diversification create more wealth for the merged banks, 
but most of the created wealth goes to targets. The CAAR(-1, +1) for the activity and 
geographic diversification group is 6.45%, significantly smaller than that of the other 
three groups: 15.93%) for the geographic and activity diversification group, 12.24%) 
for the geographic focus and activity diversification group, and 14.37% for the 
geographic diversification and activity focus group (shown in column (2) of Panel A 
of Table 2.8). The targets capture the bulk of the wealth created by the bank merger 
deal. 
2.6 Misvaluation Hypothesis: Multivariate Test 
Misvaluation proxies can be correlated with growth prospects for both 
"inherent confounding" and "measurement confounding" reasons. First, investors may 
for psychological reasons overvalue growing firms (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1994). Second, measurement error in the mispricing proxy may be correlated with 
growth opportunities, as market price in P/B and P/V manifests the market's rational 
assessment of future growth opportunities, not just pricing errors. 
The superiority of P/V is that it takes into account analyst forecasts of future 
earnings and hence addresses the mismeasurement confounding limitation. To address 
the inherent confounding while also resolving any remaining mismeasurement 
confounding effects, we follow Dong et al. (2006) by using multivariate testing to 
assess the effect of misvaluation, P/V, and control for growth prospects by P/B (2 
years before). Since P/B (2 years before) is distant from the present, it will not take 
away part of the misvaluation effect that we want to assess. 
Consequently, we perform multivariate analysis with additional controls as 
described in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. The regressions include geographic and activity 
diversification dummies, size variables, and leverage as control variables. The 
rationale for including leverage as a control variable stems from theories of financing 
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and capital structure, which predict that leverage levels are likely to be related to a 
firm's growth opportunities. Therefore, it is possible that leverage and financing 
constraints influence bidder behavior (Dong et al., 2006). 
Table 2.9 reports logistic regression results relating bidder and target valuation 
measures to the means of payment. The dependent variable, stock, is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 when the deal is paid with stock and zero otherwise. 
We run regressions both on P/V and P/V ranks. First, we regress stock on bidder and 
target P/B (2 years before). Second, we regress stock on bidder and target P/Vs, 
shown in columns (2) and (3). Third, we include both P/B (2 years before) and P/V 
ranks (see columns (4) and (5)) to examine whether there is incremental explanatory 
power from acquirer P/V as a misvaluation measure given P/B (2 years before). 
The multivariate findings for target valuations in Table 2.9 are generally 
consistent with those of the univariate analysis. The regression results demonstrate 
that a higher target P/B (2 years before) is associated with more frequent use of stock 
than cash. This holds in all three types of regression specifications, suggesting that 
bidders view targets as having valuable growth options. Since growth prospects are 
subject to uncertainty, this explains why bidders are more likely to use their 
overvalued equity rather than cash for the right to exercise such options. It is 
interesting to note that the significance and magnitude of the coefficient of the target 
P/B (2 years before) is substantially higher than that of the bidder P/B (2 years 
before). This suggests that the use of stock in bank mergers is influenced more by the 
growth prospects of targets than those of bidders. Consistent with the univariate 
analysis reported in Section 4.2, both bidder and target P/V measures are positively 
associated with more frequent use of stock, and the results are robust when P/B (2 
years before) and control variables are included in the regression. In regressions (2) 
and (3), the coefficient of the target P/B (2 years before) remains positive and 
statistically significant while that of the bidder P/B (2 years before) becomes 
insignificant when we account for the impact of target and bidder P/V. This 
supplements evidence suggesting that bidders' growth prospects have no impact on 
the use of stock in bank mergers. The coefficients for both bidder P/V and P/V 
(k=12.5%) are 0.775 and 0.741 in the second and third regressions, respectively (both 
significantly positive at the 1% level). These bidder P/V regression coefficients are 
consistent with the view that bidder overvaluation, not its growth prospects, dictates 
the choice of stock payment. It is worthwhile to highlight that the positive and 
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statistically significant coefficient of target P/V overvaluation also increases the 
probability of using stock in bank merger deals. When we run the regression on 
bidder and target P/V ranks, we get similar results, as shown in columns (4) and (5), 
respectively. 
Next we examine the relation between premium and announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR (-2, 2)) for both bidders and targets, and our key 
overvaluation measures, controlling for other effects as in Table 2.9. These regression 
results are reported in Table 2.10. Consistent with the univariate findings, Panel A of 
Table 2.10 indicates that higher bidder valuations, indicated by a higher rank for the 
bidder's P/V and P/V (k=12.5%), are associated with higher bid premiums.6 However, 
the growth prospects don't have significant influence on the premiums paid. 
Panel B of Table 2.10 shows that the growth prospects of target and bidder 
have no bearing on bidder and target abnormal announcement returns. Hence, the 
market's reaction to bank mergers is not driven by the growth prospects of the 
merging banks. Consistent with the findings of the univariate analysis, we find that 
higher bidder valuation (P/V), which mainly measures the misvaluation component of 
stock price, is associated with lower bidder returns. This inverse relation implies that 
the market's negative reaction is influenced by the bidder's overvaluation. The last 
three regressions of Panel B (Table 2.10) show that the target abnormal returns in 
response to bank acquisition announcements have a positive, but tenuous association 
with bidders' overvaluation after controlling for other effects. 
2.7 Discussion 
In this section, we review and discuss the most important empirical findings of 
the previous four sections. According to the misvaluation hypothesis of Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003), managers value firms rationally, whereas investors do not. Bidders 
acquire undervalued targets (i.e., relative to fundamentals) using cash, but purchase 
targets with equity when their equity is more overvalued than that of targets. On the 
other hand, managers of target firms accept equity offers if the target is also 
overvalued, as takeovers give target management the opportunity to cash out illiquid 
stock or option holdings. In general, the misvaluation hypothesis mirrors the insight 
6 The result concerning the positive relation between bidder's P/V rank and premium is still consistent when we 
add geographic diversification, activity diversification and leverage as controls But due to the great reduction of 
sample size (more than 60% smaller), when relative size (the market value of bidder/the market value of target) 
and deal size are added to the regression, the relation becomes vague, so we don't present here. 
34 
that the willingness of target management to cash out tends to be greater when the 
target is more overvalued. Furthermore, bidder and target misvaluation creates 
different strategic incentives that influence not only the means of payment (as 
described above), but also the premium paid and the abnormal returns. 
Following Dong et al. (2006), we distinguish the misvaluation hypothesis 
from the Q hypothesis. According to the Q hypothesis, takeovers redeploy target 
assets to different uses (Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2002). The payoffs from such target asset redeployment hinges on the quality of 
bidder and target management, as well as on the growth prospects of bidders and 
targets. Tobin's Q, the ratio of firm market value to book value, provides a measure of 
the bidder or target's ability to create value from existing assets. The Q hypothesis of 
acquisitions predicts that acquisitions involving bad targets (with lower valuation) and 
good bidders (with higher valuation) generate greater total gains than transactions 
involving good targets and bad bidders. Thus, higher bidder valuation and lower 
target valuation are supposed to be associated with high bidder and target returns 
(Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991), and Dong et al. (2006)), and higher bid premiums 
as well. Controlling for P/B (2 years before), P/V provides a more rigorous test for the 
misvaluation hypothesis. 
2.7.1 Relative Bidder-target Valuations 
As shown in Section 4.1, bidders involved in deals targeting public firms have 
valuation ratios that are higher, on average, than those of their targets (both P/B (2 
years before) and P/V). This is consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis. Similar to 
the findings of Dong et al. (2006) for industrial firms, this relationship is strong for 
equity offers, but for cash offers, the findings appear to be mixed. Section 4.1 also 
shows that the equity bidders are more overvalued than the cash bidders; the 
bidder-target difference in valuation is, on average, greater in equity offers than in 
cash offers. Under the misvaluation hypothesis, a profitable equity offer requires the 
bidder to be overvalued relative to the target, and the target managers are more likely 
to accept the equity bid and cash out when the target is overvalued. Since the less 
overvalued bidders are more likely to execute takeover deals using cash, the 
bidder-target difference in cash deals should be smaller. Our results in Section 4.1 
show that equity offers are associated with higher bidder valuations than cash offers, 
and the bidder-target difference in valuation is, on average, greater among equity 
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offers than cash offers. 
2.7.2 Target Valuation and Takeover Characteristics 
As shown in Section 4.2, targets with higher growth prospects (P/B (2 years 
before)) are associated with greater use of equity as a means of payment, consistent 
with the misvaluation hypothesis. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
overvalued targets are more likely to receive equity offers since managers at 
overvalued targets are willing to cash out even to relatively overvalued equity bidders. 
If target firms resist selling when they are undervalued, the bidders may seek to 
circumvent target management using a cash tender offer. 
The Q hypothesis predicts that greater total gains are generated by acquisitions 
involving bad targets (low P/B) and good bidders (high P/B) than transactions 
involving good targets (high P/B) and bad bidders (low P/B). Our empirical results do 
not seem to provide strong support for the Q hypothesis. 
According to the misvaluation hypothesis, greater undervaluation increases a 
target's incentive to fight to maintain a premium (or avoid a discount) relative to 
fundamental value, and the bidder has a stronger incentive to increase its bid relative 
to the market in order to ensure success. Thus, more undervalued targets (P/B or P/V) 
should earn higher premiums relative to the market price. Our evidence in Panel B2 of 
Table 2.3 and Panel A of Table 2.10 shows that premiums and target 
announcement-period returns are both higher on average for low-valuation targets. 
This is consistent with the assertion that undervalued targets fight for a higher 
premium (relative to an unduly low market price), and takeover bids act to correct 
preexisting target mispricing (Dong et al., 2006). 
2.7.3 Bidder Valuation and Takeover Characteristics 
Section 4.2 shows that equity bidders are more overvalued than cash bidders. 
Likewise, higher bidder valuation is associated with greater use of equity. Both 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that overvalued bidders are more likely to 
acquire target resources using their overpriced stock as currency. 
Both our univariate and multivariate analysis find that higher bidder valuation 
is associated with higher bid premium, which supports the misvaluation hypothesis. It 
is possible that the overvalued bidders either find it easier to raise enough capital to 
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make a high bid, or are more willing to make a high bid using their overvalued stock. 
Our univariate analysis documents that higher bidder valuation (both P/B and 
P/V measures) is associated with higher target stock returns, and that higher bidder 
valuation (both P/V measures) is associated with lower bidder announcement-period 
returns, both providing additional support for the misvaluation hypothesis. The 
relation between bidder valuation and bidder market returns is also robust in our 
multivariate analysis. According to the misvaluation hypothesis, the market tends to 
mistakenly believe that the bidder is paying too much in equity offers, for the market 
overvalues the equity offered more than it overvalues the target assets. Thus, investors 
tend to view an offer by an undervalued bidder as a masterful stroke, and an offer by 
an overvalued bidder as a clumsy blunder (Dong et al., 2006). The investors view the 
target of an overvalued bidder as a beneficiary of this good deal. 
2.7.4 Some New Findings 
Our results in Panels Dl and D2 of Table 2.3 in Section 4.3 indicate that a 
higher bidder valuation decreases the likelihood of merging with public target firms, 
and increases the likelihood of offering stock payment. Thus, the shareholders of 
private targets are more likely to accept stock exchange mergers (even when the 
bidders' stocks are overvalued) than cash payments. By exchanging stock, 
shareholders of private companies become shareholders of public companies, which 
could raise their reputation and diversify their investment, which is consistent with the 
misvaluation hypothesis. 
The results in Panels A2 and B2 of Table 2.4 show that the short-term 
combined returns of the two parties are positive for both cash and stock deals. 
Mergers executed with stock payment generate higher returns, due primarily to the 
positive returns of targets. 
Diversification and financial constraints also influence the merger wealth 
effects. Based on Table 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8, both geographic and activity diversification 
create wealth for the targets. Moreover, as shown in Table 2.10, the higher the 
financial leverage of the bidder, the less wealth is created for bidder and target 
shareholders around the announcement. 
2.8 Summary and Conclusion 
Much research has been conducted into U.S. banking merger activities. In 
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contrast to earlier studies, in this study we examine whether inefficient stock market 
misvaluation is an important driver of U.S. banking mergers. The advantage of 
focusing on a specific industry is that it can minimize the inter-industry disturbances 
and provide industry-specific insights for future research. 
To test whether the theoretical framework of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) fits 
banking mergers, we use two measures of valuations for bidders and targets: 
price-to-book (P/B (2 years before)) and price-to-residual income valuation (P/V). 
Since P/B (2 years before) incorporates the growth prospects of the firms, P/V 
becomes a stringent evaluator of misvaluation. P/B (2 years before), which stands for 
the firm's growth prospects, helps us differentiate the Q hypothesis—that high-quality 
bidders improve bad targets more than bad bidders improve good targets—from the 
misvaluation hypothesis. Following Dong et al. (2006), the intrinsic value (V) is 
estimated using the three-period forecast horizon residual income model of Ohlson 
(1995) and the perpetual residual income model that does not rely on analysts' 
forecasts of future earnings prospects, which allows us to estimate V for a much larger 
sample of banks. Hence, unlike previous studies, our analysis uses two P/V measures 
in testing the overvaluation hypothesis. 
In our univariate tests, the empirical results obtained generally support the 
misvaluation hypothesis. With both measures, bidders are more highly valued relative 
to their targets in the full sample, especially among equity offers. More highly valued 
bidders are more likely to use stock and less likely to use cash as consideration, are 
willing to pay more relative to the target market price, are more likely to acquire 
private targets than public targets, and earn lower announcement-period returns. 
Higher valuation targets receive lower premium relative to market price, are more 
likely to receive equity offers, and experience lower announcement period returns (in 
univariate tests). 
A number of studies, including Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004), develop models in which merger waves result from 
managerial timing of market overvaluations of their firms. In addition, several studies, 
including Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2004) and Verter (2003), conduct empirical 
research on the aggregate valuation and the takeover market. These empirical studies 
confirm that there are long-term swings in market valuation and aggregate takeover 
activity, and offer support for the view that valuations affect takeover activity. A 
challenge for this literature is the fact that the effective sample size is reduced by the 
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low frequency of merger waves, and the fact that aggregate measures mix the effects 
of bidder and target valuations. Our tests therefore complement these papers. 
However, none of the extant research focuses on the banking industry. To fill this 
niche, we challenge the traditional views of banking mergers and find considerable 
evidence documenting the relationship between stock market valuation and banking 
mergers, as well as the monitoring theory and diversification theory. 
We investigate banking mergers by classifying them into public targets and 
private targets and test diversification and monitoring effects at the same time. The 
monitoring hypothesis is supported by mergers with stock payment, whereas liquidity 
effects play a role in mergers executed using cash payment. Compared with DeLong 
(2001), who uses data from 1988 to 1995, we use a larger sample during a longer 
horizon, offering a more comprehensive picture of banking mergers based on 
diversification. Consistent with Delong (2001), geographic and activity diversification 
tend to decrease bidding firms' value, reflected by the bidder's negative abnormal 
returns around the merger announcement, but they increase target firms' value. When 
banks merge with private targets, diversification does not significantly influence the 
bidders' wealth. Activity diversification also plays a significant role in influencing 
whether the bidder make a full acquisition, as well as the payment premium. 
We try to make a comprehensive investigation into U.S. banking mergers, and 
make several contributions to the existing literature. There is no reason to believe that 
banking mergers are motivated only by misvaluation, while it is a strong driver, other 
factors can also play an important (e.g., improving performance by diversifying). Our 
sample encompasses banking mergers targeting both public and private banks, and 
offers some intriguing insights into the differences between the two types. Our 
findings support the monitoring effects theory and the misvaluation theory. 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Bank Merger Bids 
Panel A: Frequency Description 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample, including all 2,148 U S banking bids dunng 
1985-2006 Panel A reports the number of bank merger bids, number using stock payment, number of bids aiming at 
public targets, cross-state bids, nominal and inflation-adjusted average deal value, nominal and inflation-adjusted 
average market value of bidders, nominal and inflation-adjusted average market value of targets, by calendar year 
"Inflation adjusted" means that the deal value and the market prices have been adjusted to the Gross Domestic 
Product Implicit Price Deflator composed by the U S Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis*, 










































































































































































































Average Market Value 







































































































Table 2.1 (continued) 
Panel B: Median Size of Mergers, by Type 
This panel reports the number of bank mergers and median deal size for each type of merger, classified by method 
of payment, type of target bank, geographic diversification (cross-state), and activity diversification 
Merger Type 
Number of Median Deal . . . r T , , , Relative Deal Size (Deal it \r 1 /<r i\ Value of Bidders . . . ; Mergers Value (Smil) /<p ., Value/Bidder MV) 6 v ' (Smil) ' 
All Mergers 
Mergers with Stock Payment 
Mergers with Cash Payment 
Mergers with Public Targets 
Mergers with Private Targets 
Geographic and Activity Diversification 
Geographic and Activity Focus 
Geographic Focus and Activity Diversification 







































Mean Acquirer and Target Valuation Ratios by Method of Payment 
Panel A: P/V Based on Three-period Forecast Horizon Residual Income Model 
This panel reports how the two valuation measures, the pnce-to-book ratio P/B (2 years before) and the pnce-to-intnnsic income value ratio P/V axe related to the type of target (public vs private) and 
method of payment The intrinsic value is estimated using a three-period forecast horizon residual income model, where the cost of capital (re(t)) is based on finn-specific CAPM and the discount rate is set 
at 12 5% The t-statistics of differences between acquirer and target and between stock and cash offers are reported in brackets The sample includes successful merger bids for both public and private targets 










P/B (2 years before) 
P/V(re{t) = 12 5%) 
P/V 
P/B (2 years before) 
P/V(re(i)=12 5%) 
P/V 
P/B (2 years before) 
P/V(re{t) = 12 5%) 
P/V 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Panel B: P/V Based on Perpetual Residual Income Model 
This panel reports how the two valuation measures, the pnce-to-book ratio P/B (2 years before) and the price-to-intnnsic value ratio P/V are related to the type of target (public vs pnvate) and method of 
payment The intrinsic value is estimated using our constructed perpetual residual income model, when the cost of capital (re(r)) is based on firm-specific CAPM, as well as when the discount rate is set at 
12 5% The t-statistics of differences between acquirer and target, and between stock and cash offers, are reported in brackets The sample includes successful merger bids aiming at both public and private 










P/B (2 years before) 
P/V (re(t) = 12 5%) 
P/V 
P/B (2 years before) 
P/V(re(t)=12 5%) 
P/V 
P/B (2 years before) 
P/V(re(i) = 12 5%) 
P/V 
P/B (2 years before) 





































































Acquirer of Private Targets 






































































Mean Bank Merger Characteristics by Bidder or Target Valuation Ratio 
Quintiles 
This table reports the relation between valuation measures of targets and bidders to takeover characteristics For 
the entire sample, acquirer and target firms are ranked by valuation ratios (P/B (2 years before) and P/V) and 
separated into quintiles and assigned a rank between 1 and 5, with 1 being the lowest ratio quintile (most 
undervalued) P/B (2 years before) is the pnce-to-book ratio P/V is the price-to-value ratio, where the intrinsic 
value is estimated using the residual income model when the cost of equity (re(t)) is estimated using firm-specific 
CAPM This table reports mean acquisition characteristics for each of the quintiles and difference in means 
between ranks 1 and 5 In panel Bl and Dl, The intrinsic value is estimated using a three-period forecast horizon 
residual income model, In panel B2 and D2, the intrinsic value is estimated using our constructed perpetual 
residual income model Bid premium is the ratio of the bid price offered by the acquirer to the target stock price 5 
days prior to the announcement of the takeover bid Acquirer and target cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are 
measured over the 3 days (-1, 1) around the announcement (day 0) of the acquisition using the market model 
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is the average of all CAR in one quintile N is the total number of 
acquisitions in each quintile The sample includes merger announcements where the bidding bank is listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX, orNASDAQ during 1985-2006 ***, **, and * denote that the difference in means between ranks 
1 and 5 is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, based on the two-sample Mest 
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Probability Probability of Bid Target Bidder 
of Stock Merging with a Premium Announcement Announcement 
Payment (%) Public Target (%) (%) CAAR (%) CAAR (%) 
Panel A: 
Target P/B Rank 




5 (High Growth Prospect) 
Difference 5-1 
Panel Bl: Mergers 




























before the announcements) 
52 83 1145 
2124 10 18 
23 05 11 47 
2196 9 54 
4 37 5 82 



























0 79 0 39 
0 26 121 
1 77 1 48 
4 63 4 42 
9 68 1 82 







Panel B2: Mergers Sorted by Target PA7 Ratio (constructed perpetual residual income model) 








Bidder P/B Rank 
































Panel Dl: Mergers Sorted 















































19 78 10 06 
10 11 6 70 
1683 1056 
16 03 10 04 
6 86 3 67 
-12 92** .^ 39*** 
before the announcements) 
5 42 3 28 
15 65 9 36 
2176 12 16 
46 25 10 48 
32 03 13 46 
26 61** io is*** 







7 66 4 3 
1301 1033 
18 45 9 47 
25 6 8 25 
32 12 9 1 




















Panel D2: Mergers Sorted by Acquirer P/V Ratio (constructed perpetual residual income model) 


































44 77 11 62 
2625 11 18 
22 36 6 95 









Daily AAR and CAAR around Bank Merger Announcements 
This table presents daily average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for 
both acquirers and targets for stock (Panels Al and A2) and cash (Panels Bl and B2) deals, using the market 
model The sample of the bidders paying in stock (cash) consists of 1,094 (1,098) successful acquisition deals 
completed over the 1985-2006 period for short-term analysis, as identified in the Thomson ONE Banker Database 
We estimate AAR and CAAR using the market model with the following regression 
RJt = <Xj + BjRmt + eJt 
The abnormal return for the stock of firmy on day t is defined as the difference between the actual return on day t 
and the estimated return from the estimation period 
ARlt = Rlt-(&I+j3lRmt) 
AARt) is the sample mean on trading day t 
AARt- N 




; = 1 t=Tx 
Standardized cross-sectional t-statistics are reported in brackets ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Panel Al : Daily AAR for Deals with Stock Payment Deals 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Panel A2: CAAR for Stock Payment Deals 
























(2) Targets that are 




































































Table 2.4 (continued) 
Panel Bl: Daily AAR for Deals with Cash Payment Deals 



































































(2) Targets that are 















































































































































































Table 2.4 (continued) 
Panel B2: CAAR for Cash Payment Deals 






























































































Bank Merger Long-term CAAR 
This table presents long-term cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR), calculated using the market model 
and Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model, for bidders using stock and cash payment The sample of the bidders 
paying stock (cash) consists of 1,063 (1,085) successful acquisition deals completed over the 1985-2006 penod for 
1- and 2-year analysis, as identified in the Thomson ONE Banker Database Panels Al and A2 report abnormal 
returns for acquirers for stock deals Panels Bl and B2 report abnormal returns for acquirers in cash deals 
In Panels Al and Bl , we estimate CAAR using the market model with the following regression 
Rjt = aj + PjRmt + £jt 
The abnormal return for the stock of firm j on day (month) t is defined as the difference between the actual return 
on day (month) t and the estimated return from the estimation period 
ARjt = R)t-{aj+p)Rmt) 
Over an interval of two or more trading days beginning with day (month) Tlt and ending with day (month) T2, the 
CAAR are 
CAARTi r2 = - £ j = i ZtL^
 AR>t 
We also estimate long-term CAAR using the Fama and French 3-factor model with the following regression 
RJt = a + PjRmt + s,SMBt + h,HMLt + £ |t 
The abnormal return for the common stock of finny in month t is 
ARJt = RJt - (a, + j} Rmt + s,SMBt + n,HMLt) 
Over an interval of two or more trading months beginning with month 7\, and ending with month T2, the CAAR 
are 
N T2 
) = 1 t=Ti 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Panel A: Long-term CAAR for Bidders Using Stock Payment 
This panel reports the long-term CAAR for acquirers using stock payment In Panel Al, we estimate CAAR using 
the market model In Panel A2, we estimate CAAR using the Fama and French 3-factor model We report CAAR 
by the type of target (public or private) In Panels Al and Bl, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics are reported 
in brackets ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 
one-tailed test 
Panel Al: Long-term CAAR for Stock Payment Deals Using the Market Model 









































Long-term CAAR for Stock Payment Deals Using the Fama and French 3-factor Model 








































Panel A3: Long-term CAAR for Stock Payment Deals Using the INV&lA-factor Model 









































Table 2.5 (continued) 
Panel B: Long-term CAAR for Bidders Using Cash Payment 
This panel reports long-term CAAR for acquirers using cash payment In Panel Bl, we estimate CAAR using the 
market model In Panel B2, we estimate CAAR using the Fama and French 3-factor model We report CAAR by 
the type of target (public or private) In Panels Al and Bl, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics are reported in 
brackets ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 
one-tailed test 
Panel Bl: Long-term CAAR for Cash Payment Deals Using the Market Model 








































Panel B2: Long-term CAAR for Cash Payment Deals Using the Fama and French 3-factor Model 








































Panel B3: Long-term CAAR for Cash Payment Deals Using the INV&IA-factor Mode 










































CAAR for Geographic Focused vs. Diversifying Bank Mergers 
This table reports the shareholder wealth effects of geographic diversification on 3-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR(-1, +1)) For j t h firm, cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) is defined CARTIT2 = 22%T ARJt For each sample group, CAAR(-1, +1) is the average of all CAR(-1, +1) in the group Median CAR refers to the CAR(-1, +1) 
separating the higher half of a group from the lower half Combined returns are calculated by summing the CAR(-1, +1) of both partners in each deal around the announcements To 
test whether the median is statistically different from zero, t-statistics are used ***5**;* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a one-tail test 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
The sample consists of 2,148 domestic U S bank mergers announced between 1985 and 2006 The sample is divided into groups according to geographic diversification A geographic 
focus merger is one in which both partners are located in the same U S state, diversifying mergers are those in which the bidder and target are located in different states 
Merger Type 
(1) Number of 
Mergers 
Combined Returns for Partners 
(2) CAAR ( 3 > M A




v ' CAR Positive 
Bidders 



















7 32%*** 4 63% 77 35% 
[21 72] 
13 00%*** 10 87% 80 70% 
[19 69] 
5 58%*** 2 01% 66 99% 
[21 18] 
0 81%*** 0 64% 59 60% 
[7 58] 
-0 82%*** -0 62% 38 31% 
[-6 16] 
0 31%*** 0 20% 52 95% 
[3 6] 
6 29%*** 2 72% 78 67% 
[19 67] 
15 00%*** 12 47% 84 66% 
[24 14] 
163%*** 3 35% 80 13% 
[9 54] 
b Differences between Groups 
Geographic Focus vs Geographic Diversification -5 68%*** -6 24% -3 35% 163%*** 126% 2129% -8 71%*** -9 75% -5 99% 
t-Statistics [-7 66] [3 08] [-12 46] 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
Panel B: Public Bidders Acquiring Public Targets 
The sample consists of 1,369 domestic U S bank mergers, both sides of which are public banks, announced between 1985 and 2006 The sample is divided into groups according to 
geographic diversification A geographic focus merger is one in which both partners are located in the same U S state, diversifying mergers are those in which the bidder and target 
are located in different states ***;**;* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a one-tailed test 
Merger Type 
(1) Number of 
Mergers 
Combined Returns for Partners 
(2) CAAR (3) Me^an ( 4 ) % P o s m v e 
CAR 
Bidders 
(5) CAAR ( 6 ) ^ l a " (7)% Positive 
Targets 
(8) C A A R <9VMA
e
R















































b Differences between Groups 
Geographic Focus vs Geographic Diversification 
t-Stati sties 
-6 07%*** -5 97% -3 24% 
[-5 95] 
2 70%*** 2 19% 32 74% 
[10 62] 
-8 87%*** -9 80% -7 0 1 % 
[-9 08] 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
Panel C: Comparison between the CAAR of Bidders for Public Targets and CAAR of Bidders for Private Targets 
The sample consists of 1,369 domestic U S bank mergers, both sides of which are public banks, and 779 domestic U S bank mergers for private targets announced by public banks 
between 1985 and 2006 The sample is divided into groups according to geographic diversification A geographic focus merger is one in which both partners are located in the same 
U S state, diversifying mergers are those in which the bidder and target are located in different states ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%>, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively, using a one-tailed test 
Merger Type 
Bidders of Public Targets 
(1) Number (2) CAAR (3) Median (4) % 
of Mergers CAAR Positive 
Bidders of Private Targets 
(5) Number of (6) CAAR (7) Median (8)% 
Mergers CAAR Positive 
Difference 












































b Differences between Groups 
Geographic Focus vs Geographic Diversification 
t-Stati sties 
2 70%*** 2 19% 32 74% 
[10 62] 




CAAR for Activity Focused vs. Diversifying Bank Mergers 
This table reports the effects of activity diversification on 3-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR(-1, +1)) For j t h firm, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is defined 
CARTiT2 = }Zt=T ARjt For each sample group, CAAR(-1, +1) is the average of all CAR(-1, +1) in the group Median CAR refers to the CAR(-1, +1) separating the higher half of a 
group from the lower half Combined returns are calculated by summing the CAR(-1, +1) of both partners in each deal around the announcements To test whether the median is 
statistically different from zero, t-statistics are used ***;**;* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%>, and 10% level, respectively, using a one-tailed test 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
The sample consists of 2,148 domestic U S bank mergers announced between 1985 and 2006 The sample is divided into groups according to activity diversification, which are 
classified by SIC codes If the first three digits of each party's SIC code are the same, the deal is classified as activity focus, otherwise it is classified as an activity diversification deal7 
Merger Type 
(1) Number of 
Mergers 




/CN/-AAD (6) Median ._, . . _ 





















































b Differences between Groups 




-7 81% -1 13% 1 07%*** 
[4 77] 
1 05% 16 64% -9 34%*** 
[-9 22] 
-9 62% -4 25% 
7SIC Code Banks, non-United States chartered (6000), National Commercial Banks (6021), State Banks, member fed reserve (6022), Commercial Banks, nee (6029), Saving 
Institutions, federally chartered (6035), Saving Institutions, not federally chartered (6036), Credit Unions, Federally Chartered (6061), Credit Unions, not Federally Chartered (6062), 
Branches and agencies of foreign banks (6081), Foreign Trade & International Banking Institutions (6082), Personal Credit Institutions (6141), Short-Term Business Credit Institutions 
(6153), Offices of Bank Holding Companies (6712), Offices of Holding Companies, nee (6719) 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
Panel B: Public Bidders Acquiring Public Targets 
The sample consists of 1,369 domestic U S bank mergers, both sides of which are public banks, announced between 1985 and 2006 The sample is divided into groups according to 
activity diversification, which are classified by the SIC codes If the first three digits of each party's SIC code are the same, the deal is classified as activity focus, otherwise it is 
classified as a diversification deal ***;**;* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a one-tailed test 
Merger Type 
(1) Number of 
Mergers 
Combined Returns for Partners 
(2) CAAR ( 3 ) < ^ i a n (4)% Positive 
Bidders 
















7 40%*** 4 75% 77 71% 
[19 37] 
14 99o/o*** 13 09% 79 23% 
[8 89] 
8 56%*** 5 67% 78 02% 
[22 49] 
0 67%*** 2 91% 79 31% 
[5 18] 
-113%*** -0 98% 69 97% 
[-3 29] 
0 38%*** 0 47% 55 99% 
[3 24] 
6 70%*** 0 72% 60% 
[18 23] 
16 08%*** 13 19% 84 13% 
[9 98] 
8 14%*** 3 27% 80 12% 
[21 98] 
b Differences between Groups 
Activity Focus - Activity Diversification 
t-Statistics 
-7 59%*** -8 34% -152% 
[-7 02] 
1 80%*** 3 89% 9 34% 
[12 04] 
-9 38%*** -12 47% -23 96% 
[-8 19] 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
Panel C: Comparison between the CAAR of Bidders for Public Targets and CAAR of Bidders for Private Targets 
The sample consists of 1,369 domestic U S bank mergers, both sides of which are public banks, and 779 domestic U S bank mergers for private targets announced by public banks 
between 1985 and 2006 The sample is divided into groups according to activity diversification, which are classified by SIC codes If the first three digits of each party's SIC code are 
the same, the deal is classified as activity focus, otherwise it is classified as a diversification deal ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%>, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, 
using a one-tailed test 
Merger Type 
Bidders of Public Targets 
(1) Number A R (3) Median (4)% 
of Mergers C A R Positive 
Bidders of Private Targets 
(5) Number of /6N C A A R (7) Median (8)% 
Mergers CAR Positive 
Difference 








1150 0 67%*** 2 91% 79 31% 
[5 18] 
219 -113%*** -0 98% 69 97% 
[-3 29] 
1369 0 38%*** 0 47% 55 99% 
[3 24] 
656 0 14% -0 08% 48 32% 
[ H I ] 
123 0 37% -0 03% 48 78% 
[1 13] 








B Differences between Groups 
Activity Focus - Activity Diversification 
t-Statistics 
1 80%*** 3 89% 9 34% 
[7 13] 




CAAR for Geographic and Activity Focused vs. Geographic and Activity-diversifying Bank Mergers 
This table reports the interaction effects of geographic and activity diversification on 3-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR(-1, +1)) The sample consists of 2,148 
domestic U S mergers announced between 1985 and 2006 between banking firms A geographic focus merger is one in which both partners are located in the same U S state, 
diversifying mergers are those in which the bidder and target are located in different states An activity-focusing merger is one in which both partners have SIC codes where the first 
three digits are the same 
For j t h firm, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is defined CARTll-2 = £ t l r ARJt For each sample group, CAAR(-1, +1) is the average of all CAR(-1, +1) in the group Median 
CAR refers to the CAR(-1, +1) separating the higher half of a group from the lower half Combined returns are calculated by summing the CAR of both partners in each deal around 
the announcements To test whether the median is statistically different from zero, t-statistics are used ***;**j* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively, using a one-tailed test 
Panel A: CAAR of Each Group 
Merger Type 
Geographic and Activity Focus 
t-Statistics 
Geographic and Activity Diversification 
t-Statistics 
Geographic Focus and Activity Diversification 
t-Statistics 















dlan <4>% v CAR Positive 
6 45%*** 4 19% 77 10% 
[19 28] 
15 93%*** 13 14% 77 08% 
[9 5] 
12 24%*** 8 70% 8148% 
[18 53] 
14 37%*** 1124% 79 49% 
[1149] 
5 58%*** 2 01% 66 99% 
[21 18] 
Bidders 
(5) CAAR ( 6 ^ 4
e
p
d l a n
 p<
7>% v ' CAR Positive 
101%*** 0 83% 62 52% 
[8 81] 
-0 67%** -0 66% 38 30% 
[-2 28] 
-0 85%*** -0 60% 39 23% 
[-5 68] 
-0 53%* -0 67% 39 80% 
[-19] 
0 31%*** 0 20% 52 95% 
[3 6] 
Targets 
(8) CAAR ( 9 ' M A
e d l a n i 1 Q ) % 
' CAR Positive 
5 14%*** 2 34% 77 85% 
[16 59] 
16 80%*** 12 58% 83 33% 
[1043] 
14 17%*** 1145% 85 65% 
[22 22] 
15 65%*** 12 77% 84 62% 
[13 09] 
8 29%*** 3 35% 80 13% 
[27 88] 
Table 2.8 (continued) 
Panel B: Differences between Groups 
Merger Type 
Geographic/Activity Focus vs Geographic/Activity Div 
t Statistics 
Geographic/Activity Focus vs Geo Focus/Activity Div 
t-Stati sties 
Geographic/Activity Focus vs Geo Div/Activity Focus 
t-Stati sties 
Geographic/Activity Div vs Geo Focus/Activity Div 
t-Stati sties 
Geographic/Activity Div vs Geo Div/Activity Focus 
t-Stati sties 
Geographic Focus/Activity Div vs Geo Div/Activity Focus 
t-Statistics 
Combined Returns for Partners 
(2) CAAR « M A
e
R





v ' CAR Positive 
-9 48%*** -8 95% 0 02% 
[-5 54] 
-5 79%*** -4 51% -4 38% 
[-7 82] 
-7 92%*** -7 05% -2 39% 
[-6 12] 
15 93%*** 13 14% 77 08% 
[8 84] 
156% 190% -2 41% 
[0 75] 
-2 13% -2 54% 199% 
[-1 51] 
Bidders 
(5) CAAR W ^ ™ (?) % 
CAR Positive 
168%*** 149% 24 22% 
[5 33] 
1 86%*** 1 43% 23 29% 
[9 87] 
154%*** 150% 22 72% 
[5 1] 
-0 67%** -0 66% 38 30% 
[-2 03] 
-0 14% 0 01% -1 50% 
[-0 35] 
-0 32% 0 07% -0 57% 
[-101] 
Targets 
(8) CAAR W ^ " " ( 1 0 ) t
% 
v ' CAR Positive 
-1166%*** -10 24% -5 48% 
[-7 11] 
-9 03%*** -9 11% -7 80% 
[-12 74] 
-10 51%*** -10 43% -6 77% 
[-8 51] 
16 80%*** 12 58% 83 33% 
[9 7] 
1 15% -0 19% -1 29% 
[0 57] 





This table reports the logistic regression results, which predict the probability of using stock payment for the deals 
The sample includes all banking merger announcements during 1985-2006 where need to calculate both P/B (2 
years before) and P/V P/B (2 years before) is pnce-to-book ratio of the bidder. P/V is pnce-to-value ratio of the 
bidder, where the intrinsic value is estimated using our constructed perpetual residual income model when the cost 
of equity {re(t)) is estimated using firm-specific CAPM and 12.5%, respectively Stock = 1 if the bidder uses stock 
to pay for the deal, 0 for cash payment. Activity diversification = 1 if the acquirer and target have different first 
three digits of the COMPUSTAT SIC codes, 0 otherwise. Geographic Diversification = 1 if the acquirer and target 
are located in the different states; 0 otherwise Relative size = acquirer market value / target market value Deal 
size = announced transaction value Leverage = acquirer total debt / total assets For each coefficient, the second 
row reports the p-value 
Stock 
Intercept 
Target P/B (2 years before) 
Bidder P/B (2 years before) 
Target P/V 
Bidder P/V 
Target P/V (k= 12 5%) 
BidderP/V(k=12 5%) 
Target P/V Rank 
Bidder P/V Rank 
Target P/V (k=12.5%) Rank 
Bidder P/V (k=12 5%) Rank 
Activity Diversification 
Geographic Diversification 
Log of Relative Size 







































































































N 109 77 77 77 77 
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Table 2.10 
Least Squares Regressions 
This table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on offer price premium, bidder cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) and target CAR Premium is defined as the bid price over the target's stock price 4 weeks 
before the takeover announcement minus 1, then times 100 Individual acquirer and target announcement-period 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are measured over the 2-day event window ( - 1 , 0), beginning 1 day before the 
announcement (day -1) and ending on the announcement day (day 0) of the acquisition The sample includes all 
announced banking merger deals in which both the acquu-er and target are listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ during 1985-2006 and the data needed to calculate both P/B (2 years before) and W a r e available P/B 
(2 years before) is the pnce-to-book ratio P/V is the pnce-to-value ratio, where the intrinsic value is estimated 
using our constructed perpetual residual income model and the cost of equity (re[t)) is estimated using 
firm-specific CAPM and 12 5%o, respectively Stock = 1 if the bidder uses stock to pay for the deal, 0 for cash 
payment Activity diversification = 1 if the acquirer and target share different first three digits of the 
COMPUSTAT SIC codes, 0 otherwise Geographic diversification = 1 if the acquirer and target are located in the 
same state, 0 otherwise Relative size = acquirer market value / target market value Deal size = announced 
transaction value Leverage = acquirer total debt / total assets For each coefficient, the second row reports the 
p-value 
Panel A: OLS Regression on Premium 
Premium 
Intercept 25 846** 11388 3 359 1817 2 496 1111 5 202 4 447 4 893 4 546 
[0 013] [0 337] [0 432] [0 639] [0 551] [0 767] [0 355] [0 399] [0 365] [0 369] 
Target P/B (2 years before) -5 72 -2 594 -0 719 0 526 -1278 0 300 -0 164 0 532 -0 548 0 379 
[0 107] [0 487] [0 374] [0 489] [0 121] [0 698] [0 847] [0 512] [0 515] [0 641] 
Bidder P/B (2 years before) 3 641 1100 0771 -0 179 1213* -0 069 0 493 -0 078 0 796 0 003 
[0 192] [0 710] [0 264] [0 781] [0 081] [0 915] [0 492] [0 909] [0 260] [0 997] 
Target P/V Rank 
Bidder P/V Rank 
Target P/V (k=12 5%) Rank 





























































































T a b l e 2 . 1 0 (continued) 
Panel B: OLS Regression on Bidder/Target CAR 
Dependent Variable 
Bidder CAR(-2, 2) 
Intercept 
Target P/B (2 years before) 







Log of Relative Size 
Log of Deal Size 
Leverage 
-0 040*** 0 002 0 006 
[0 007] [0 950] [0 814] 
0 002 -0 004 -0 004 
[0 740] [0 596] [0 574] 
0 003** 0 004 0 004 









0005 0011 001 
[0 529] [0 412] [0 417] 
-0 004 0 006 0 006 
[0 657] [0 643] [0 638] 
-0 019** 0 013 -0 013 
[0 011] [0 195] [0 179] 
-0 026*** -0 018 -0 018* 
[0 002] [0 110] [0 100] 
0 000 -0 002** -0 002** 
[0 939] [0 032] [0 026] 
Target CAR(-2, 2) 
0 175** 0 259*** 0 253*** 
[0 013] [0 002] [0 003] 
-0 006 -0 011 -0 010 
[0 777] [0 679] [0 733] 
0 005 0 007 0 006 









0015 0014 0011 
[0 730] [0 766] [0 817] 
0 040 0 085* 0 082* 
[0 350] [0 082] [0 095] 
0 000 0 016 0 020 
[0 989] [0 681] [0 623] 
-0 010 0 024 0 027 
[0 792] [0 580] [0 536] 
-0 003 -0 005* -0 005* 
[0 182] [0 069] [0 070] 
N 109 77 77 




0 012 0 002 
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Chapter III 
Managerial Gambling Attitudes in U.S. Banking Acquisitions 
"Ifyou are in a hole, stop digging, it is often advised. But it can be difficult to follow 
such advice. We wish to 'gamble for resurrection' in the belief that our chosen 
strategy to support Manchester City ...will finally pay off. " 
(Forbes (2009), p. 165) 
3.1 Introduction 
The purchase of lottery tickets is, from the perspective of classical economics, 
irrational. The desire to gamble, however, is deeply rooted in the human psyche 
(Kumar (2009)). The fascination with games of chance comes from biological, 
psychological, religious, and socioeconomic factors, which jointly determine the 
propensity to gamble (e.g., France (1902), Brenner (1983), Walker (1992))8. In this 
study, we investigate the extent to which managerial attitudes toward gambling 
influence investment decisions in the context of bank acquisitions. 
Expected utility theory states that the decision maker chooses between risky or 
uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values, that is, the weighted 
sums obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by their respective 
probabilities (Mongin (1997)). Although expected utility theory had been the 
dominant normative and descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty for 
several decades, it began to face more and more challenges from alternative models 
(see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1986, 1992), Machina 
(1987), Fishburn (1988), Camerer (1989)). Expected utility theory "does not provide 
an adequate description of individual choice," (Tversky and Kahneman (1992), p. 297) 
and in the past few decades, a number of economists and psychologists have 
accumulated a large body of experimental evidence that, when people make decisions 
under risk, they often depart from the predictions of expected utility (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)). 
Among the so-called non-expected utility models, Kahneman and Tversky's 
8Keno slips, the first recorded signs of a lottery, used in ancient China (second millennium B.C.) to help finance 
major government projects like the Great Wall of China (Shelley (1986)). Lottery, as an important tool of 
recreation and gambling, has also been a popular theme in film and television fiction. For example, the Russian 
writer Dostoevsky (himself a problem gambler) portrays in his novel The Gambler (1997) the psychological 
implications of gambling and how gambling can affect gamblers. He also associates gambling and the idea of 
"getting rich quick", suggesting that Russians may have a particular affinity for gambling. 
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(1979) prospect theory and Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) cumulative prospect 
theory are the most prominent (Barberis and Huang (2008)). Under prospect theory, 
when faced with choices involving simple two and three outcome lotteries, people 
behave as if maximizing an "S" shaped value function. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
assert the value function is i) defined on the deviation from the reference point, ii) 
generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses, iii) steeper for losses 
than for gains, which implies that people are generally loss averse. Two main 
ingredients of (cumulative) prospect theory are reference dependence and probability 
weighting. 
Reference dependence refers to the tendency of decision makers to frame 
outcomes into gains and losses relative to a reference point (Schneider and Spalt 
(2010)). "The simplest reference point is often zero, or the current level of wealth" 
(Forbes (2009), p. 166). Moreover, Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009) show that offer 
prices are biased toward the 52-week high. An offer's probability of acceptance 
discontinuously increases when the offer exceeds the 52-week high; conversely, 
bidder shareholders react increasingly negatively as the offer price is drawn upward 
toward that price. Merger waves occur when high recent returns on the stock market 
make it easier for bidders to offer the 52-week high. However, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) also point out that the reference point could shift, and alter the 
preference order for prospect. Specifically, due to incomplete adaptation to recent 
losses, individuals are likely to integrate their prior losses into the future prospects, 
and choose more adventurous choices, that is, gambling in loss space. 
Probability weighting, refers to the overweighting of low-probability gains, 
which may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) develop a new version of prospect theory, using information 
about cumulative gains, or losses, an individual faces as moving away from some 
reference level of wealth and employing cumulative rather than separable decision 
weights. The cumulative prospect theory makes it possible "to discuss movements in 
probability even when individual probabilities themselves are hard to calculate with 
any precision" (Forbes (2009), p. 177). 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky's (1979)), which predicts risk 
aversion over gains combined with risk seeking in towards losses, is further 
developed into a fourfold separation of attitudes to risk in cumulative prospect theory 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). By examining 25 graduate students from Berkeley 
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and Stanford, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) find evidence of a distinctive fourfold 
pattern of risk attitudes9, predicting that people facing a risky prospect will be: (1) risk 
seeking over low-probability gains, (2) risk averse over high-probability gains, (3) 
risk averse over low-probability losses, and (4) risk seeking over high-probability 
losses. "So for gambles involving significant probabilities (say 10%) the original 
statement of prospect theory seems to work fine. It is just at the tails of the 
distribution at near certainties, or near impossibilities, that an inversion of attitudes to 
risk appears to occur." (Forbes (2009), p. 177) 
Higher gambling propensity can be directly translated into a probability 
weighting function that overweights small probability events (Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992)). According to cumulative prospect theory, investors exhibit a preference for 
skewness, shown in the weighting function by overweighing the tails of the 
distribution. A number of studies emphasize the potential role of gambling attitude in 
investment decisions (Shefrin and Statman (2000), Statman (2002), Polkovnichenko 
(2005), Barberis and Huang (2008), Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010)), and some 
papers analyze the implications of skewness-loving preferences (Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1976), Barberis and Huang (2008)). Barberis and Huang (2008), use 
these properties of cumulative prospect theory as a way of understanding some 
anomalies in financial markets and find that a security's own skewness can be priced 
and that a skewed security can earn a negative average excess return. 
Shefrin and Statman (2000) develop a positive behavioral portfolio theory 
(BPT) and explore its implications for portfolio construction and security design. 
Optimal securities for BPT investors resemble combinations of bonds and lottery 
tickets. The authors explore the similarities between optimal BPT securities and real 
world securities such as bonds, stocks, and options and find that the BPT efficient 
frontier and the mean-variance efficient frontier, in general, do not coincide. 
Statman (2002) points out that lottery playing and stock trading are 
negative-sum games—games that combine high risk with negative expected 
returns—and provides explanations for the reasons why people play/trade on them. 
First, all lottery players and stock traders are overconfident, thinking they are above 
average and likely to win, even in a negative-sum game. Second, lottery players and 
9 As asserted by Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 306), "the most distinctive implication of prospect theory is the 
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes " 
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stock traders aspire to move up in life, from the working class to the middle of the 
upper class. 
Polkovnichenko (2005) presents experimental evidence in support of 
preferences with rank dependency.10 Using Survey of Consumer Finances data, the 
author documents two widespread patterns that are inconsistent with expected utility: 
(i) Many households simultaneously invest in well-diversified funds and in poorly 
diversified portfolios of stocks, and (ii) some households with substantial savings do 
not invest anything in equities. The portfolio choice models with rank-dependent 
preferences are quantitatively consistent with the observed diversification. 
Barberis and Huang (2008) focus on the probability weighting component of 
Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) cumulative prospect theory. In contrast to the 
prediction of a standard expected utility model, the authors find that a security's own 
skewness can be priced: A positively skewed security can be overpriced and can earn 
a negative average excess return. 
Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) test the prediction that stocks with high 
idiosyncratic skewness should have low expected returns and find that expected 
idiosyncratic skewness and returns are negatively correlated. Specifically, the 
Fama-French alpha of a low-expected-skewness quintile exceeds the alpha of a 
high-expected-skewness quintile by 1.00% per month. Furthermore, the coefficients 
on expected skewness in Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions are negative and 
significant. Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) also find that idiosyncratic volatility is 
a strong predictor of idiosyncratic skewness, and both idiosyncratic volatility and 
skewness having significant explanatory power for expected returns, independent of 
the other. 
Kumar (2009), shows that the propensity to gamble and investment decisions 
are correlated. At the aggregate level, individual investors prefer stocks with lottery 
features, and, like lottery demand, the demand for lottery-type stocks increases during 
economic downturns. In the author's cross-sectional analysis, socioeconomic factors 
that induce greater expenditure in lotteries are associated with greater investment in 
lottery-type stocks; that is, state lotteries and lottery-type stocks attract very similar 
socioeconomic clienteles. 
10 Rank dependency theory is designed to explain the behavior observed in the Allais paradox, which is a choice 
problem designed by Allais (1953) to show an inconsistency of actual observed choices with the predictions of 
expected utility theory, as well as for the observation that many people both purchase lottery tickets (implying 
risk-loving preferences) and insure against losses (implying risk aversion) 
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Schneider and Spalt (2010) analyze takeover announcements for public U.S. 
targets from 1986 to 2008 and find that gambling attitudes matter in takeover 
decisions. Specifically, the offer price premium is higher in acquisitions where the 
target's stock has characteristics similar to those of lottery tickets (high skewness, 
high volatility, and low price). The authors also find that, in these lottery-type 
acquisitions, both bidder announcement returns and expected synergies from the deal 
are lower while target returns are higher. 
This paper examines whether probability weighting and, more generally, 
gambling attitudes have important implications in the context of bank merger 
decisions. Specifically, we explore their impact on the price paid in bank acquisitions 
and the market's reaction to bank takeover bids. Since probability weighting captures 
the tendency of managers to overweight small probability events and to underweight 
medium to large probability events, we conjecture that managers of acquiring banks 
exhibiting gambling attitudes and a preference for positively skewed lotteries will 
tend to the offer higher price premiums (i.e., overvalue small probabilities of large 
future returns) for targets that have characteristics similar to those of lottery tickets. 
This tendency is expected to be pronounced for targets with a highly skewed 
distribution of future returns. As a result, this is expected to have a negative impact on 
the bidder's announcement returns and, all else being equal, increase announcement 
returns for the target. Moreover, since managers subject to probability weighting 
perceive the upside return potential of the target to be higher than it actually is, 
synergies should, on average and all else being equal, be lower in deals for which 
gambling attitudes matter. Following Schneider and Spalt (2010), we develop a proxy 
for the attractiveness of a specific target firm as a gambling object and provide 
empirical evidence for the above predictions. 
The house money effect could also motivate gambling. Thaler and Johnson 
(1990) first introduced the house money effect by considering how prior outcomes are 
combined with the potential payoffs offered by current choices. They assert that 
agents are inclined to take larger risks when prior outcomes have been positive. The 
evidence from Thaler and Johnson (1990) provides important insights into how 
individuals make sequential decisions. Agents that exhibit the house money effect 
consider large or unexpected wealth gains to be distinct from the rest of their wealth, 
and are thus more willing to gamble with such gains than they ordinarily would be. 
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) develop a model based on "loss aversion" of 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the "house money effect" of Thaler and Johnson 
(1990), and show that individuals who have experienced recent gains are less averse 
to risky gambles. 
Futhermore, Thaler and Johnson argue that the house money effect is generally 
consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) if agents apply 
"hedonic editing"11 to the gambles they face. What distinguishes the house money 
effect is that it focuses primarily on dynamic decision making in which people have to 
choose how to frame prior losses vs. gains and how such choices influence future 
risk-taking. It emphasizes behavior shifting towards risk. That is, increasing 
risk-taking after prior gains (Liu, Tcai, Wang and Zhu (2006)). So far, there are a 
number of laboratory based studies (Battalio and Jiranyakul (1990), Gertner (1993), 
Keasey and Moon (1996), Ackert, Charupat, Church and Deaves (2006), and Post, 
Van den Assem, Balrussen, and Thaler (2008)), and also a few empirical studies for 
the house money effect (Liu, Tcai, Wang and Zhu (2006), Brunnermeier and Nagel 
(2008), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009), Gamble, K. J., B. Johnson and D. Kim, 
2009). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to empirically address the 
house money effect in the context of bank managerial acquisition choices by 
investigating on the relation of bidder banks' risk seeking behavior to their prior 
performance (stock market performance and net income). 
Essay II is organized as follows. Section II develops our hypotheses based on 
related literature. Section III describes the methodology and data. Section IV reports 
the empirical results. Section V summarizes our findings and offers conclusions. 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
This paper's main conjecture is that gambling preferences are relevant for 
bank acquisitions. This perspective has several testable implications for lottery 
acquisitions that involve targets whose stocks have the salient features of lotteries. 
The first is associated with the relation between lottery acquisitions and offer price 
premiums, synergies, and announcement returns. In an acquisition, managers subject 
to probability weighting overvalue targets that look like attractive bets, and thus may 
be willing, all else being equal, to pay a higher offer price premium (the price paid for 
Specifically, "after a gain, subsequent losses that are smaller than the original gain can be integrated with the 
prior gain, mitigating the influence of loss aversion and facilitating risk-seeking" (Thaler and Johnson (1990), 
p657) 
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the target's stock relative to its pre-announcement value) in lottery acquisitions (see 
HI in Appendix A). 
Second, managers are more likely to acquire a lottery-type target for the same 
price than an otherwise identical non-lottery-type target, despite the fact that it has a 
lower expected level of synergies than the latter (see H2 in Appendix A). If synergies 
are expected to be significantly higher in lottery-type acquisitions, a higher offer price 
premium may not be indicative of gambling behavior. However, if Hypotheses 1 and 
2 gain support in the data, then managers may be willing to pay a higher premium in 
lottery acquisitions in spite of the lower synergies. Evidence consistent with 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 would provide strong support for our main gambling conjecture. 
Third, assuming that the market is efficient, the announcement return for the 
acquiring bank is expected to be lower in lottery acquisitions (see H3 in Appendix A). 
Because overpayment is a pure wealth transfer to target shareholders, target 
announcement returns are expected to be higher. At the same time, smaller synergies 
for lottery acquisition correspond to lower target announcement returns, since the 
benefits that can be split between the bidder and the target are smaller. Whether target 
announcement returns are higher or lower in lottery acquisitions is thus an open 
question. If we consider the offer price premium paid by the bidders due to their 
gambling attitude, higher announcement returns for target shareholders despite 
possibly lower synergies for lottery acquisitions would provide strong evidence in 
support of the gambling hypothesis (see H4 in Appendix A). 
Besides the conjectures about bid premiums, synergies, and announcement 
returns jointly, we develop another set of hypotheses that focuses on some unique 
implications of our gambling conjecture. Examining the effects of broad 
macroeconomic indicators, lottery studies demonstrate that people find the tiny 
probability of a large gain more attractive when economic opportunities are not very 
bright. Evidence for this has been provided in the context of state lotteries12 (Brenner 
and Brenner (1990), Mikesell (1994)) and in the context of the behavior of individual 
investors, who invest more in lottery-type stocks in bad economic conditions (Kumar 
(2009), Schneider and Spalt (2010)). Since economic downturns limit the growth 
Dunng economic downturns, people are attracted more toward various forms of gambling, including state 
lotteries (Mikesell (1994)) During the Great Depression, the popularity of lottery playing and gambling increased 
dramatically in the United States (Brenner and Brenner (1990)). Sweden experienced a similar phenomenon: 
Gambling there became extremely popular and gambling activities such as soccer pools were made legal during 
the Great Depression (Tec (1964)). 
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opportunities available through typical economic activities, gambling in acquisitions 
is likely to become more attractive (see H5 in Appendix A). 
Furthermore, "a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to 
accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise" (Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), p. 287). The propensity to gamble is likely to increase when a 
manager is in the loss space, which is a direct implication of the shape of the prospect 
theory value function. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) point out peoples' risk-seeking 
attitude in choices involving sure losses; that is, the willingness to gamble increases 
strongly if the alternative is a sure loss. We hypothesize that gambling in the loss 
space is also relevant for bank takeovers. If a bank has recently underperformed (e.g., 
low stock returns in the recent past, large difference with the 52-week high, or a 
negative net income last year), its managers may deem themselves to be in the loss 
space and are likely to be more eager to gamble on a long shot (see H6a in Appendix 
A). 
Finally, we also investigate the influence of house money effect, originally 
proposed by Thaler and Johnson (1990). Specifically, if bank managers consider prior 
stock market earnings as windfall gains, the house money effect hypothesis predicts 
that they may lead them to increased risk-taking (see H6b in Appendix A). 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Dataset Construction 
The sample data on U.S. bank takeover bids are obtained from the Thomson 
ONE Banker Database (SDC) for the period January 1985 to December 2006. The 
data originally included 1369 complete deals, of which both the bidders' and the 
target firms' stocks were traded on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange, or NASDAQ, with Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data 
available around takeover announcements. We compute a lottery index, the LIDX, 
described in detail below, for the targets of 1059 of these deals and report them in 
Table 3.1. Following Schneider and Spalt (2010), the lottery characteristics of the 
targets in bank acquisitions are measured by the LIDX. This index is used in the 
analysis as the main explanatory variable.' 
This index is in the spirit of Kumar (2009), who developed a similar index in his analysis of the gambling 
behavior of retail investors 
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The LIDX is designed to capture the similarity of the salient features of lottery 
tickets—low price, high idiosyncratic volatility, and expected idiosyncratic 
skewness—with those of the target's stock. The motivation behind these three 
features of the LIDX is that attractive gambles are typically cheap (i.e., low-price 
ticket), have risky payoffs (i.e., have a high variance), and, most importantly, have a 
very low probability of a large payoff (i.e., have high skewness). Hence, the 
attractiveness of the target as a gamble is measured by an increase in the LIDX. The 
idiosyncratic skewness, EISKEW, captures the asymmetry of the probability 
distribution of the target's stock return. Specifically, a positive EISKEW means the 
return of the target is positively skewed. The idiosyncratic volatility, IVOLA, 
measures the variation of the target's stock return after excluding systematic risks and 
analogous factor loadings. Following Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009), we require that 
the bidder offers to purchase at least 85% of the target firm's shares. After we exclude 
deals with missing offer prices, missing transaction values, a value smaller than 
$lmillion, or missing bidder/target financial dates, 100 offers remain. 
To measure idiosyncratic skewness, we follow Harvey and Siddique (2000) 
and Kumar (2009) and decompose total skewness into its idiosyncratic and 
systematic components. Specifically, EISKEW is a scaled measure of the third 
moment of the residual obtained by fitting the market model, the excess market 
return being an explanatory variable, to the daily stock returns time series over a 
1-year period ending in month t - 1. IVOLA is the standard deviation of the 
regression residual obtained by fitting a Fama-French (1993) three-factor model to 
the daily stock returns time series over a 3-year period ending in month t-2 for an 
announcement in month t. Stock prices are obtained from the CRSP database. 
Fama-French factors are obtained through the Fama-French factor installer of the 
Eventus 9 software. 
The price is also used as one of the defining characteristics of lottery-type 
stocks, since the price is likely to be an important characteristic of stocks that may be 
perceived as lotteries (Kumar (2009)). Stock price refers to the price on the last 
trading day in month t - 1 before the takeover announcement in month t. For our 
original sample, we assume that stocks in the lowest Mi stock price percentile, the 
highest Mi idiosyncratic volatility percentile, and the highest Mi idiosyncratic 
skewness percentile are likely to be perceived as lottery-type stocks. All three sorts 
are carried out independently. We choose k = 20, following Schneider and Spalt 
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(2010), where 20 indicates the group with the lowest price and the highest volatility 
and skewness The target price is used as one of the defining characteristics of 
lottery-type stocks because investors with gamblmg attitudes are seeking cheap bets 
and are thus attracted to low-price stocks (Kumar, 2009) 
To construct the LIDX, which measures how much a target stock shares 
salient lottery (attractive gamble) characteristics, stocks are assigned to vigintiles 
(semi-deciles) by price, idiosyncratic volatility, and expected idiosyncratic skewness 
The price, volatility, and skewness vigintile assignments are added for each target to 
produce a score ranging from 3 to 60, which is then scaled to range from 0 to 1, using 
(Score - 3)/(60 - 3) As in Kumar (2009), we use a similar measure to define 
lottery-type and non-lottery-type stocks and to label a target with a high LIDX value, 
that is, above the median LIDX value, as a lottery type Hence, we call a transaction 
involving a lottery-type target a lottery acquisition Table 3 1 reports the number of 
acquisitions by year and the lottery characteristics of targets, as measured by the 
LIDX The year 2000 witnessed the highest percentage of lottery-type acquisitions, 
603%, whereas 1985 had the lowest percentage of lottery-type acquisitions, 109% 
In addition to our main explanatory variable, LIDX and its components, we 
control for variables identified in the literature in all regressions Specifically, 
following Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009), we control for the return on assets (ROA), 
defined as net income over total assets (from Compustat), market capitalization, 
defined as price (from CRSP) times shares outstanding (from CRSP), and the 
market-to-book ratio, defined as market capitalization divided by book equity All 
these variables are calculated for bidders and targets and are based on the last fiscal 
year-end before the announcement Following Moeller, Schhngemann, and Stulz 
(2004) and Schneider and Spalt (2010), we include additional control variables, 
dummy variables indicating payments through stock only, competed deals (with more 
than one bidder), geographic diversification, and activity diversification We also 
include the relative sizes of transaction value and bidder's market capitalization in all 
regressions We obtain the aggregate market-level sentiment index data from Jeffrey 
Wurgler's website,14 the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), and the 
52-week highest price from the CRSP (to construct DIFF52) 
http //pages stern nyu edu/~jwurgler/ 
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The dependent variables we use include the offer price premium, bidder and 
target cumulative abnormal returns, and synergy. The offer price premium is reported 
by the SDC and is defined as the bid price over the target's stock price four weeks 
before the takeover announcement minus 100%. We calculate bidder and target 
cumulative abnormal returns over a three-day window around the announcement, 
using market model estimates based on daily data with an estimation period over days 
[-230, -31]. Synergies are estimated as a weighted average (by market capitalization) 
of target and bidder percentage returns, following the procedure in Bradley, Desai, 
and Kim (1988). Appendix B provides an overview of all the variables used in our 
analysis and their definitions. 
3.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.2 displays descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our 
analysis. We report the mean, median, standard deviation, and several percentiles of 
interest, as well as the number of observations for each variable, which varies due to 
data availability. The median offer price premium is 10.53%. Median cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns (ACAR) for bidders from day -1 to day +1 
(ACAR[-1,+1]) is 0.2%. The median target announcement return (TCAR[-1,+1]) is 
3.8%o. Synergies, the combined change of bidder and target returns, (Synergy[-1,+1]) 
are 0.76%, so offers are, on average, expected to create value. The median bidder has 
a market capitalization of $364.57 million, a market-to-book ratio of 3.11, and an 
ROA of 1.18%. The median target, considerably smaller than the bidder, has a market 
capitalization of $79.81 million. Since we are looking only at public targets, these are, 
on average, sizable firms. For the mean offer, Table 3.2 shows that the proposed deal 
value is 27.25% of the bidder's market capitalization, which illustrates that these 
transactions are important financial decisions for bidders. With 1.60, the average 
market-to-book ratio of targets is smaller than the market-to-book ratio of bidders, 
9.31, indicating that acquiring banks are relatively overvalued. The performance of 
targets in terms of ROA is 1.03%) and thus consistent with the view that 
underperforming firms are more likely to become targets. If we consider deal 
characteristics, Table 3.2 shows that 38% of the bids offer stock only, while 1.1% of 
the deals have more than one bidder. For 25% of the offers, the bidder and the target 
come from different states; for 17%> of the offers, the partners have Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes where the first three digits are different. 
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3.4 Empirical Results 
This section presents our main empirical results. We largely follow the prior 
literature (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009), 
Schneider and Spalt (2010)) in our regressions and control variables. Specifically, we 
regress the offer price premium, synergy, and announcement returns on our lottery 
measures (LIDX, EISKEW, IVOLA, and Price) and a set of bidder and target financials 
suggested by Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009) and Schneider and Spalt (2010), 
including bidder (target) ROA (ROA), acquirer (target) market-to-book ratio (MB), 
bidder (target) market value (MCAP), and some deal characteristics such as relative 
size, method of payment (Stock), competed deals with multiple bidders (Competed), 
and activity/geographic diversification (Activity Diversification, Geo Diversification). 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) in all regressions. 
Our main lottery variable is LIDX, where a higher index value indicates 
greater attractiveness as a gamble. Although we do not expect any single measure to 
capture the attractiveness of a target as a gamble as well as the LIDX, for 
completeness we also present the results of using the components of the index, namely, 
idiosyncratic skewness, idiosyncratic volatility, and the price of the target's stock 
prior to the announcement. 
3.4.1 Offer Price Premiums 
As discussed earlier, we hypothesize that the offer price premium will be 
higher in lottery acquisitions (HI). We find strong support for this hypothesis when 
we regress the offer price premium on LIDX (Table 3.3). We also find that the 
individual components of the LIDX are positively related to the offer price premium, 
as expected: The offer price premium increases with skewness, EISKEW, and 
volatility, IVOLA, and decreases with target stock price. The coefficients of LIDX are 
39.641 (column (1) of Table 3.3) and 37.56 (column (5) of Table 3.3), both highly 
statistically significant. A change of one standard deviation in LIDX increases the 
offer price premium by 31.85%) (= 0.19 x 37.560/22.4).15 The average market 
capitalization of targets is $937.69 million, so a 31.85% higher premium represents an 
15 Since 0.19 is the standard deviation of the LIDX (Table II), 37.560 is the coefficient of the LIDX (Table III), 
and the average offer price premium is 22 44% (Table II), a change of one standard deviation in the LIDX 
increases the offer price premium by 31.85%. 
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additional $66.90 million (= $937.69 million x 31.85% x 22.4%)16 in consideration 
paid to target shareholders for the average transaction. For all 1059 completed deals, 
this represents a total increase of $705 billion in the price paid to targets due to 
gambling attitudes. Hence, the effects we document are economically large. 
For the control variables, we do not find that strongly consistent relations exist. 
There is a positive relation between bidder performance, measured by ROA, and the 
premium paid, but it becomes tenuous when we add more control variables into the 
regressions. The relative size, measured by the transaction value divided by the bidder 
market value, competed deals, and activity diversification also have a slightly positive 
influence on the bid premium. 
3.4.2 Synergies 
Our second hypothesis is that, on average, synergies will be lower in lottery 
acquisitions. Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), we measure synergies as the 
sum of target and bidder three-day announcement returns weighted by the market 
capitalizations of the target and bidder, respectively. Table 3.4 shows that although 
there is a positive relation between synergy and LIDX, there is no significant and 
consistent relation between synergy and the components of the LIDX. 
3.4.3 Bidder and Target Announcement Returns 
Since lottery acquisitions pay higher offer price premiums, we expect negative 
bidder returns around the announcement date (H3). Panel A of Table 3.5 presents the 
results concerning H3. When we regress three-day announcement returns for the 
acquiring firm on the LIDX, we find no significant effects of the LIDX or it 
components. 
Because of the significant positive effects of the LIDX on offer price 
premiums and unclear effects on synergies, we expect lottery acquisitions to have a 
positive impact on target announcement returns. Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the 
results for targets. Three-day announcement returns are positively related to the 
lottery index and its constituents, high skewness and high volatility, and negatively to 
the price of the target. These results are consistent in both regression groups. A 
16 The average market value of the target firm is $937.69 million and the average offer price premium is 22.44% 
(see Table II), so a 31.85% increase in the premium will lead to an additional $66 90 million increase in the target 
firm's market value. 
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change of one standard deviation in the LIDX increases target announcement returns 
by 79.86% (= 0.377 x 0.19/8.97%),17 or about $67.17 million (= $937.69 million x 
0.377 x 0.19).18 This is consistent with bidders overpaying sufficiently for targets 
that look like attractive gambles to compensate for the small gains from synergies. 
3.4.4 Robustness Checks 
Our empirical results provide strong evidence suggesting that gambling 
attitudes influence deal pricing in lottery acquisitions. This section presents a battery 
of robustness checks for our regressions with the offer price premium, synergies, and 
announcement returns as dependent variables. Additional tests are conducted to 
ensure that the stock-level regression estimates are robust to micro structure issues, or 
economic downturns. These results are reported in Table 3.6. The main results 
concerning the coefficient of LIDX from, column (5) in Tables 3.3 to 3.5 are shown at 
the top of each panel of Table 3.6 as a baseline. For conciseness, we show only the 
results for our main index, the LIDX. 
In Table 3.6, we run our regressions on a number of subsamples. First, we 
divide the sample into large and small bidders, since there is a size effect in 
acquisition announcement returns and the effect is robust to firm and deal 
characteristics (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)). We also split our sample 
into large and small targets to determine if our results are driven by a particular 
subsample of targets. Furthermore, we use the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) to see if our regressions are picking up effects related to sentiment, that is, 
market effects, rather than effects from managerial preferences. Table 3.6 presents the 
lottery acquisition effects in all subsamples. 
We find that the effects for lottery acquisitions are more consistent with our 
hypotheses when the bidder is bigger. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) 
provide evidence that managers of large firms pay more for acquisitions and that the 
premium paid increases with firm size after controlling for firm and deal 
characteristics. The authors claim that it is consistent with hubris being more of a 
17 Since 0 19 is the standard deviation of the LIDX (Table U), the coefficient of the LIDX is 0 377 (Table V, Panel 
B), and the three-day average cumulative abnormal return of the target firms is 8.97% (Table II), a change of one 
standard deviation in the LIDX increases target announcement returns by 79.86%. 
18 Since 0.19 is the standard deviation of the LIDX (Table II), the coefficient of the LIDX is 0.377 (Table V, Panel 
B), and the average market value of the target firm is $937.69 million (Table II), a change of one standard 
deviation in the LIDX increases the target firm's market value by $67.17 million 
19 The results are similar when we conduct the same regressions on the other two components of the LIDX, 
namely, EISKEW and IVOLA 
78 
problem for large firms. Hannan and Pilloff (2007) find that larger banks are less 
likely to be acquired, consistent with the hypothesis that post-merger integration is 
more difficult for relatively large targets. We also find evidence that the offer price 
premium and target announcement return for lottery acquisitions are higher when the 
target is smaller. 
Our results concerning the market effects are consistent with the traditional 
view that investor sentiment affects merger financing decisions, as in Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003), and lottery stocks become more attractive to optimists and speculators 
when sentiment is estimated to be high (Baker and Wurgler (2006)). Specifically, we 
find that bidding banks pay higher premiums and synergy is lower when sentiment is 
high. The target announcement returns are also slightly higher in high-sentiment 
periods. 
The existing evidence from lottery ticket sales and retail investment in lottery 
stocks (Brenner and Brenner (1990), Mikesell (1994), Kumar (2009)) shows that if 
business opportunities deteriorate in economic downturns, gambling is likely to 
become more attractive. Following Schneider and Spalt (2010), we use the CFNAI to 
measure the state of economic conditions. This is a monthly index designed to gauge 
overall economic activity and related inflationary pressure by combining information 
in 85 existing monthly indicators of U.S. economic activity. A zero value for the 
index indicates that the national economy is expanding at its historical trend rate of 
growth, negative values indicate below-average growth, and positive values indicate 
above-average growth. In columns (8) and (9) of Table 3.6, we split our sample by 
positive and negative CFNAI values 1 month prior to the announcement. The 
evidence shows that during economic downturns, bidders pay higher premiums for 
targets, consistent with the hypothesis that bad economic conditions make gambling 
relatively more attractive. 
3.4.5 Gambling in the Loss (Win) Space? 
Prospect theory predicts that the willingness to accept gambles increases in the 
loss space. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) illustrate that, based on observation, most 
people would prefer a sure $3000 over an 80% chance to win $4000 and nothing 
otherwise, while preferring a gamble involving a 20% chance to pay nothing (and thus 
to break even) and an 80% chance of losing $4000 over a sure loss of $3000. The 
observed preferences can be described by a value function that is concave in the gain 
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space and convex in the loss space of the value function, that is, individuals are risk 
seeking when they face losses and risk averse when they face gains. We extend the 
one-stage reasoning in this simple experiment to the more complex two-stage 
situation of bank takeovers where managers find gambling more appealing when they 
are in the loss space and a successful bet would be considered to provide a chance to 
get out of it. 
On the other hand, the house money effect conjecture predicts that managers 
may become more risk seeking when they are in the win space. That is, gambling 
emerges as a more attractive option when the pain from the suffering of an 
unsuccessful bet could be mitigated by prior gains. 
Table 3.7 documents a positive association between prior market performance 
(valuation) and banking mergers, and provides evidence that inefficient stock market 
overvaluation is an important driver of U.S. bank mergers, which is consistent with 
the house money effect. Specifically, Panels A and B of Table 3.7 show the how 
different relative valuation measures before the announcements, the price-to-book 
ratio P/B (2 years before) and the price-to-intrinsic income value ratio P/V, are related 
to the method of payment. The price-to-intrinsic income value ratio (P/V) is estimated 
using a three-period forecast horizon residual income model and perpetual residual 
income model, respectively. The empirical results show that bidders are more highly 
valued relative to their targets in the full sample, especially among deals associated 
with equity offers. In addition, the evidence reveals that (i) highly valued bidders are 
more likely to use stock than cash, (ii) are willing to pay more relative to the target 
market price, and (iii) earn lower announcement-period returns. 
Panel C of Table 3.7 further reports how the bidder performances before the 
merger announcements are related to the method of payment. For the entire sample, 
compared with the targets, the bidders have significantly higher stock prices (smaller 
difference between stock price and 52-week high (DIFF52)), higher net income (NI) 
and higher return-on-assets (ROA) in the last fiscal year. These features become more 
salient in the subsample with stock payment. Specifically, the average net income of 
all the bidders is $196.77 million, significantly higher than that of all the targets, 
which is $63.31 million. And the average return-on-assets of all the bidders is 1.21%, 
significantly larger than that of all the targets, which is 1.05%o. 
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Overall, these results indicate that after prior gains, bidders are likely to 
increase their risk taking investment, especially by playing with their 
better-performed (overvalued) stocks to acquire other banks. 
To further test the role of prior losses/gains, we need to identify the conditions 
that managers may either feel the desire to enter a gamble to break even a prior loss or 
take more risks in response to prior gains. First, we conjecture that the more (less) a 
bidder's stock price is below its 52-week high, Large Diff52 (Small Diff52), the more 
likely the manager feels to be in the loss (win) space. Second, we use bidder's stock 
returns to identify when a manager will feel he is in a loss (win) space. Specifically, a 
manager will feel to be in the loss (win) space if the firm's stock return has been 
particularly low (high) over the last year, Low RET52 (High RET52). Third, we use 
an accounting measure and conjecture that being in the loss (win) space is more likely 
if the firm has reported negative (positive) net income in the previous fiscal year, 
Positive Nil2 (Negative Nil2). 
Table 3.8 presents the results in relation to gambling in the loss space and the 
house money effect in the win space. Interestingly, we find that bank managers tend 
to pay higher premiums for lottery-type targets if the bidder's stock price is near its 
52-week high (Small Diff52), if the bank's stock return has been particularly high 
over the last year (High RET52), or if the bank reported positive net income in the 
previous fiscal year (Positive Nil2). These results are consistent with the house 
money effect, which predicts risk taking behavior (i.e., acquiring targets with lottery 
characteristics) after prior gains. However, the results do not seem to support 
gambling behavior in the loss space. With respect to target announcement returns, the 
results indicate that targets realize greater abnormal returns when bidders' stock 
prices are near their 52 week high, or experienced high 12 month cumulative 
abnormal returns. Finally, the evidence confirms that acquiring targets with lottery 
attributes do not result in any significant synergy gains. 
In sum, we find that banks perform well before they conduct mergers, 
especially bidders using stock as a method of payment. The evidence concerning the 
managers' gambling attitude appears to be stronger when the acquirer has performed 
well in the past, which is consistent with the prediction of the house money effect. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Many financial phenomena have been discovered by researchers that are hard 
to understand in the context of the expected utility paradigm. This article is 
particularly interested in shedding light on the conjecture that gambling attitudes 
among acquiring bank managers influence their takeover decisions, and what is 
driving the managers to gamble. We pay special attention to the probability weighting 
component of cumulative prospect theory, which induces a preference for lottery-like 
skewed payoffs that may have tangible effects on deal pricing and market reactions to 
merger bids. 
Following Schneider and Spalt (2010), we form an index measuring how 
much a bank target stock shares salient characteristics of attractive gambles (i.e., high 
skewness and volatility and low price) and show that offer price premiums and target 
announcement returns are higher in bank takeover transactions involving targets with 
these gambling features. We also find evidence in support of the view that synergies 
are lower in lottery-type acquisitions. Furthermore, we find that target announcement 
returns are much higher in lottery-type acquisitions. By performing several robustness 
checks, we find that the managerial gambling attitude is more significant when the 
bidder size is above the median (which provides some evidence for the hubris 
hypothesis), the target size is below the median (consistent with the post-acquisition 
integration hypothesis), investor sentiment is above the median (consistent with the 
view that sentiment influences a firm's financial decision), or the CFNAI is negative 
(consistent with the assertion that gambling becomes more attractive during economic 
downturns). 
The evidence also shows that house money plays an important role in 
motivating banks to conduct acquisitions. Specifically, we find that the house money 
effect enhances managerial risk-seeking by encouraging top decision makers to enter 
into a merger, by paying a higher premium, when the bidding firm has just 
experienced higher market performance or earned higher net income in the previous 
year. 
Overall, our evidence supports the conjecture that managerial gambling 
attitudes matter in bank merger decisions. By examining the probability weighting 
effect in bank acquisitions, a key feature of prospect theory, our main result shows 
that the value destruction to bidder bank shareholders is prominent when bidders 




HI: Offer price premium: The offer price premium is higher if the target is an 
attractive gambling object, that is, if the target stock's characteristics more 
closely resemble salient characteristics of lotteries. 
H2: Synergies: Synergies are expected to be lower in lottery acquisitions. 
H3: ACARs: Bidder announcement returns are expected to be lower in lottery 
acquisitions. 
H4: TCARs: Target announcement returns are expected to be higher in lottery 
acquisitions. 
H5: Gambling propensity-economic downturns: During economic downturns, the 
effects of the target firm's lottery characteristics on the offer price premium, 
synergies, and announcement returns are more pronounced. 
H6a: Gambling in the loss space: The effects of the lottery characteristics of targets 
on the offer price premium, announcement returns, and synergies should be more 
pronounced for acquiring banks that have recently underperformed. 
H6b: Gambling with the house money: The effects of the lottery characteristics of 
targets on the offer price premium, announcement returns, and synergies should 
be more pronounced for acquiring banks that have recently performed well either 
on the stock market or fundamentally. 
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Appendix B: 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Name Description Source 
Lottery Variables 
LIDX Stocks are assigned to vigintiles (semi-deciles) by price, idiosyncratic 
volatility, and expected idiosyncratic skewness (where 20 represents the 
group with the lowest price and highest volatility and skewness) The 
price, volatility, and skewness vigintile assignments are added for each 
target to produce a score ranging from 3 to 60, which is then scaled to 
range from 0 to 1 using (Score-3)/(60-3) 
CRSP 
IVOLA Idiosyncratic volatility (standard deviation) of the regression residual 
using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model Residuals are 
estimated using daily data over a 3-year period prior ending in month / -
2 for an announcement in month t 
CRSP 
EISKEW Idiosyncratic skewness adopts the scaled measure of the third moment of 
the residual obtained by fitting the market model with daily stock returns 
over a 1-year period ending in month t— 1 
CRSP 
Target Price The share price of the target firm on the last trading day in month t 
before the takeover announcement in month t 
1 
Bidder Characteristics 
ROA Bidder (target) firm ROA ( net income/total assets) from the last fiscal 
year before the takeover announcement 
CRSP 
Compustat 
MB The ratio of the book value of equity (= stockholder equity - deferred CRSP, 
taxes and investment tax credit - redemption value of preferred stock) to Compustat 
the market value of equity (MCAP) the last fiscal year-end before the 
takeover announcement for the bidder (target) firm 
MCAP Price * Shares outstanding (in millions of dollars) the last fiscal year-end 
before the takeover announcement for the bidder (target) firm 
Relative Size The transaction value over the bidder's market capitalization the last 
fiscal year-end before the takeover announcement 
Deal Characteristics 
Premium The offer price premium is defined as the bid price over the target's stock 







The cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder (target) firm using the 
market model, where market model parameters are estimated over days 
(-274, -20) 
CRSP 
The cumulative abnormal dollar returns for the bidder firm, defined as SDC, 
ACAR[-1,+1] x BidderMCAP[-2] - Toehold x TCAR[-1,+1] x CRSP 
TargetMCAP[-2] 
$TCAR[-I,+1] The cumulative abnormal dollar returns for the target firm are defined as 
TCAR[-1,+1] x TargetMCAP[-2] 
CRSP 
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Synergy[-J.+I] The synergies are calculated as ($ACAR[-1,+1] + $TCAR[-1,+1]) / 
(BidderMCAP[-2] + (1- Toehold) x TargetMCAP[-2]) 
$Synergy[-l, +1] The dollar synergies are $ACAR[-1,+ 1] + $TCAR[-1,+ 1] 
Toehold The percentage of shares held by the bidder on the takeover 
announcement date 
Stock One for mergers financed with stock only, and zero for cash only 
Competed One for mergers with more than one bidder, and zero otherwise 
Geo One for mergers in which the bidder and target are located in the same 
Diversification state, and zero otherwise 
Activity One for mergers in which both partners have SIC codes where the first 
Diversification three digits are the same, and zero otherwise 
Gambling propensity 
CFNAI Weighted average of 85 existing monthly indicators of U S economic 
activity It is constructed to have an average value of zero and a standard 
deviation of one A positive index corresponds to above-trend growth, 












Variables indicating loss space 
DIFF52 The difference of the bidder's current stock price from the 52-week high, 
scaled by the current stock price The bidder's current stock price is the 
stock price on the last trading day of month t - 2 prior to the takeover 
announcement month t The 52-week high is defined as the highest share 





This table reports the number of acquisitions by year and the lottery characteristics of targets in those acquisitions 
as measured by the lottery index LIDX The LfDX measures the similarity of the target stock's charactenshcs with 
salient features of lottery tickets (low price, high idiosyncratic volatility, and expected idiosyncratic skewness) 
The LIDX increases with the attractiveness of the target as a gamble We form high- and low-LIDX groups by 



























































































































This table displays descnptive statistics for the mam variables used in our analysis The lottery index LIDX 
measures the similarity of the characteristics of the target's stock with salient features of attractive gambles LIDX 
increases with the attractiveness of the target as a gamble Its constituents are the price of the target's stock (P rice), 
expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW), and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOLA), all measured at the end of the 
second month prior to the month of the announcement Here, ROA is the bidder (target) firm ROA from the last 
fiscal year before the takeover announcement, MB is the bidder (target) firm market-to-book ratio the last fiscal 
year-end before the takeover announcement, and MCAP is the bidder (target) firm market capitalization the last 
fiscal year-end before the takeover announcement The relative size is the transaction value over the bidder's 
market capitalization the last fiscal year-end before the takeover announcement, Premium is the offer price 
premium, defined as the bid price over the target's stock price four weeks before the takeover announcement minus 
one, A(T)CAR[-1,+1] is bidder (target) announcement returns computed using the [-1,+1] event window and a 
market model estimated over days [-230,-31], and synergy [-1,+1] is defined as the weighted sum (by market 
capitalization) of the bidder and target cumulative abnormal announcement returns, following Bradley, Desai, and 
Kim (1988) Here, Stock is a dummy variable indicating that a deal is financed with stock only, and Competed is a 
dummy variable indicating deals with more than one bidder CFNAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index 
Finally, RET 12 is the cumulative return of the bidder's stock calculated over months ( - 13 to t - 2 for a takeover 
announcement in month t, DIFF52 is the ratio of the bidder's stock price at the end of month t - 2 and the 52-week 
high over months ( - 13 to t - 2 minus one, and Net Income is the net income of the last fiscal year before the 













Bidder and Target Characteristics 
Bidder ROA 
Bidder MB 
Bidder MCAP'(in billions) 
Target ROA 
Target MB 














































































































































































































Offer Price Premium 
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the offer price premium on lottery measures and control 
variables The offer price premium (Premium) is defined as the bid price over the target's stock pnce four weeks 
before the takeover announcement minus one LIDX measures the similanty of the target's stock's charactenshcs 
with salient features of lottery tickets LIDX increases with the attractiveness of the target as a gamble Its 
constituents are the price of the target's stock (Price), expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW), and 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOLA), all measured at the end of the second month prior to the month of the 
announcement All variables are defined in Appendix B *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
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This table presents the results for OLS regressions of synergies on lottery measures and control variables 
Synergies are defined following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) as weighted sum (by market capitalization) of the 
bidder and target cumulative abnormal announcement returns Bidder and target announcement returns are 
computed using the [-1,+1] event window and a market model estimated over days [-230,-31] LIDX measures the 
similarity of the target's stock's characteristics with salient features of lottery tickets LIDX increases with the 
attractiveness of the target as a gamble Its constituents are the pnce of the target's stock (Price), expected 
idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW), and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOLA), all measured at the end of the second 
month prior to the month of the announcement All variables are defined in Appendix B *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels The /-statistics for the coefficient estimates are reported in square 

































































































































































































































This table presents the results for OLS regressions of bidder announcement returns (ACAR[-1 ,+ 1]) in Panel A and 
target announcement returns (TCAR[-1,+ 1]) in Panel B on lottery measures and control variables Bidder and 
target cumulative abnormal announcement returns are computed using the [-1,+1] event window and a market 
model estimated over days [-230,-31] The lottery index LIDX measures the similarity of the target's stock's 
characteristics with salient features of lottery tickets LIDX increases with the attractiveness of the target as a 
gamble Its constituents are the price of the target's stock (Price), expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW), and 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOLA), all measured at the end of the second month prior to the month of the 
announcement All variables are defined in Appendix B *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%), 5% and 1% 
levels The /-statistics for the coefficient estimates are reported in square brackets below the estimates 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
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This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the offer pnce premium (Premium), bidder announcement 
returns (ACAR[-J, + IJ), target announcement returns (TCAR[-1,+1J), and Synergyf-1 +IJ on our lottery measures 
LIDX and control variables Bidder and target cumulative abnormal announcement returns are computed using the 
[-1,+1] event window and a market model estimated over days [-230,-31] Synergy[-I.+1J is defined following 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) as the weighted sum (by market capitalization) of the bidder and target cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns The lottery index LIDX measures the similarity of the target stock's 
characteristics with salient features of lottery tickets LIDX increases with the attractiveness of the target as a 
gamble Its constituents are the price of the target's stock (Price), expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW), and 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOLA), all measured at the end of the second month prior to the month of the 
announcement All variables are defined in Appendix B This table reports the coefficient estimates of LIDX and 
its /-statistic (in brackets), as well as the number of observations below the estimates The baseline regression is 
model (5) from Tables I to III The baseline regression is rerun for eight different subsamples (I) only deals with 
bidders above or below the median bidder size in the years of the takeover announcements, (n) only deals with 
targets above or below the median in the respective years of the takeover announcements, (in) only deals 
announced when investor sentiment is above or below the median over our sample period, where investor 
sentiment data are taken from Jeffrey Wurgler's website and lagged by two months, and (IV) only deals with 
negative or positive CFNAI *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels The t-statistics for 
the coefficient estimates are reported in square brackets below the estimates The number of observations for each 
regression is reported below the /-statistic 
94 
(1) Baseline 
(2) Large Bidder 
(3) Small Bidder 
(2)-(3) 
(4) Large Target 
(5) Small Target 
(4) - (5) 
(6) High Sentiment 
(7) Low Sentiment 
(6)-(7) 
(8) Positive CFNAI 




















































































































































Acquirer and Target Valuation (Performance) 
Before Merger Announcements by Method of Payment 
Panel A: P/V Based on Three-period Forecast Horizon Residual Income Model 
This panel reports how the two valuation measures, the pnce-to-book ratio P/B (2 years before) and the 
price-to-intnnsic income value ratio P/V are related to the method of payment The intrinsic value is estimated 
using a three-penod forecast horizon residual income model, where the cost of capital (re(t)) is based on 
firm-specific CAPM and the discount rate is set at 12 5% The t-statistics of differences between acquirer and 
target and between stock and cash offers are reported in brackets The sample includes successful merger bids for 
public targets during 1985-2006 N refers the number of bidders with valuation measures available ***, **, and * 










P/B (2 years before) 
P/V(re(t) = 12 5%) 
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P/B (2 years before) 
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P/B (2 years before) 
P/V(re(t) = 12 5%) 
P/V 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
Panel B: P/V Based on Perpetual Residual Income Model 
This panel reports how the two valuation measures, the pnce-to-book ratio P/B (2 years before) and the 
pnce-to-intnnsic value ratio P/V, are related to the method of payment The mtnnsic value is estimated using our 
constructed perpetual residual income model, when the cost of capital (re(t)) is based on firm-specific CAPM, as 
well as when the discount rate is set at 12 5%. The t-statistics of differences between acquirer and target, and 
between stock and cash offers, are reported in brackets. The sample includes successful merger bids aiming at 
public targets during 1985-2006 N refers the number of bidders with valuation measures available. ***,**,* 
denote that the difference in means is significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively 




P/B (2 years before) 2.1 A 2.78 
P/V(re(t)=12 5%) 344 , 6 1 
P/V 3.69 1 39 
P/B (2 years before) 4 49 1 94 
P/V(re(t) = 12 5%) 4 i 8 4 
P/V 4 66 161 
P/B (2 years before) 355 2 42 
P/V(re(i) = 12 5%) 3 64 196 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
Panel C: Acquirer and Target Prior Performance by Method of Payment 
This panel reports how the bidder performances before the merger announcements are related to the method of 
payment DIFF52 refers to the bidder's stock price at the end of month t-2 over the 52-week high over the 
months t -13 to t - 2 minus one, NI refers to net income in the last fiscal year before the takeover announcement, 
ROA refers to return-on-assets in the last fiscal year before the takeover announcement, 
The t-statistics of differences between acquirer and target, and between stock and cash offers, are reported in 
brackets The sample includes successful merger bids aiming at public targets during 1985-2006 N refers the 











































































































Gambling in the Loss (Win) Space 
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the offer pnce premium (Premium), bidder announcement 
returns (ACAR[-I, + 1J), target announcement returns (TCAR[-1.+1J), and Synergy[-1.+I] on our lottery measures 
LIDX and control variables Bidder and target cumulative abnormal announcement returns are computed using the 
[-1.+ 1] event window and a market model estimated over days [-230,-31] Synergy1-1,+1] is defined following 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) as the weighted sum (by market capitalization) of the bidder and target cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns LIDX measures the similarity of the target stock's characteristics with salient 
features of lottery tickets LIDX increases with the attractiveness of the target as a gamble Its constituents are the 
pnce of the target's stock (Price), expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW), and idiosyncratic volatility 
(IVOLA), all measured at the end of the second month prior to the month of the announcement This table reports 
the coefficient estimates of LIDX and its /-statistic, as well as the number of observations below the estimates The 
baseline regression is model (5) from Tables I to III The baseline regression is rerun for six different subsamples 
(I) above or below the median DIFF52 (the ratio of the bidder's stock price at the end of month t-2 and the 
52-week high over the months t -13 to / - 2 minus one), (u) above or below RET12 (the cumulative abnormal 
return of the bidder's stock calculated over months t- 13 to t - 2 for a takeover announcement in month t), and (in) 
negative or positive Nil2 (net income in the last fiscal year before the takeover announcement) *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels The /-statistics for the coefficient estimates are reported in 





(2) Small Diff52 
(3) Large Diff52 
(2) - (3) 
(4)HighRET12 
(5) Low RET12 
(4) - (5) 
(6) Positive NI 
(7) Negative NI 























































































































Envy-Motivated U.S. Bank Merger Waves 
4.1 Introduction 
The question of how to explain merger waves has been listed as one of the 
"ten unsolved problems in finance" (Brealey and Myers (1996)).20 The classic 
textbook of Brealey and Myers (1996, p. 997) states, "What we need is a general 
hypothesis to explain merger waves. For example, everybody seemed to be merging 
in 1995 and nobody 5 years earlier. Why? ... We need better theories to help explain 
these 'bubbles' of financial activity." 
Merger waves refer to periods of very intense merger and acquisition activity 
(Gaughan (1999)). During the past 100 years, the United States experienced five 
complete merger waves21: those of the early 1900s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s, 
and the 1990s.22 The academic literature has provided various explanations for the 
waves. Gorton, et al. (2009) point out that there are two salient facts about mergers 
since the 1980s: First, the average post-acquisition returns of bidders are negative. 
Studies that find negative average returns to bidders include those of You, Caves, 
Smith and Henry (1986), Varaiya and Ferris (1987), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), 
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1990), Jennings and Mazzeo (1991), Servaes (1991), 
In Brealey and Myer's classic textbook Principles of Corporate Finance (1996, p 997), the "ten unsolved 
problems in finance" refer to the following 
1 What determines project risk and present value9 2 Risk and return—What have we missed9 
3 How important are the exceptions to the efficient-market theory9 4 Is management an 
off-balance-sheet liability9 5 How can we explain the success of new securities and new markets9 
6 How can we resolve the payout controversy9 7 What risks should a firm take9 8 What is the 
value of liquidity9 9 How can we explain merger waves9 10 How can we explain international 
differences in financial architecture9 
7\ 
Some researchers have also investigated the sixth wave, from mid-2003 to 2007, which happened in both the 
United States and Europe (e g , Lipton (2006), Martynova and Renneboog (2008), Alexandndis, Mavrovitis, and 
Travlos(2011)) 
22 According to Gaughan (1999), the first merger wave (1897-1904) featured a transformation of the American 
economy from one of many small companies to larger, sometimes monopolistic firms dominating an industry The 
second merger wave (1916-1929) began in 1916 and continued until the economic downturn in 1929, featured 
many of the same types of horizontal transactions as the first wave, but also had a good percentage of vertical 
transactions It has been said that the first wave compnsed mergers leading to a monopoly period, while the second 
wave compnsed mergers leading to an oligopoly period This pattern was mirrored again in the third merger wave 
(1965-1969), which featured conglomerate acquisitions, acquiring targets outside of the bidder's own industry 
Such deals were partly caused by the fact that bidding companies wanted to expand but were restrained by the 
intense antitrust enforcement that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s The only alternative left for expansion-minded 
companies was to look outside their industry and buy companies that would not be considered in any way a 
strategic fit by today's standards The fourth merger wave (1981-1989) coincided with Ronald Reagan's 
presidency and was known for both its megamergers and its colorful hostile deals 
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Banerjee and Owers (1992), and Byrd and Hickman (1992) See also the survey by 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) Second, mergers concentrate m industries for 
which a technological or regulatory regime shift can be identified—such as 
commercial banking, telecommunications, investment banking, hotels and casmos, 
and oil and gas—making mergers an efficient response (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), and Andrade and Stafford (2004)) 
The fifth wave (1993-2000) followed the economic recession of 1990-1991, 
coinciding with Bill Clinton's presidency, with the general feature that strategic 
bidders seeking for targets in related alone busmess lines (Bruner (2004)) Bruner 
(2004) pomts out that the high merger activity m banking warrants investigation, 
since this sector-focused activity responded to overcapacity as the industry was 
deregulated Jones and Cntchfield (2005) also note the influence of deregulation on 
the bank merger wave These authors focus on the merger activities in the banking 
industry from 1985 to 2006, which covers the highly concentrated merger period 
corresponding to the fifth merger wave Sereval studies point out that mergers and 
acquisitions durmg the fifth merger cycle, durmg 1993-2000, were characterized by 
extensive overpayments, mega-deals, the overvaluation of acquiring firms, the 
prevalence of equity financing, and significant value destruction for acquiring firm 
shareholders (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson 
and Teoh (2006), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005)) 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
construct theoretical models showing that merger waves are driven by misvaluations 
in the stock market Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006), find that bidders were more overvalued than 
targets in the 1980s and 1990s Bouwman, Fuller, and Nam (2009) compare 
acquisitions during booming markets with those during depressed markets and find 
that bidders buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher 
announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance 
than those buying during low-valuation markets Bouwman, Fuller, and Nam (2009) 
contend that managerial herding explains these results 
Goel and Thakor (2010) develop a theory and provide empirical evidence 
showing that envy among chief executive officers (CEOs) can generate merger waves, 
even when the shocks that precipitated the initial mergers are purely idiosyncratic for 
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the first firm in the wave. Envy-based preferences have been investigated on basis 
of biological, psychological, sociological, and economic foundations in 
recent research studies. Martin's (1981) experiment shows that individuals are most 
inclined to compare their fortunes to those who are "near us in time, place, age, or 
reputation" (Aristotle, in Rhetoric, 1388a) and it is more important to not be worse off 
than to be better off than one's peers. 
Numerous economic studies "take the view that people are motivated by 
considerations of fairness and thus wish to reduce inequity" (Goel and Thakor (2005), 
p. 2257). Based on game theory analysis, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) find evidence that 
fairness (or inequity aversion) motives affect many people's behavior, and that 
cooperators will punish those who are selfishly noncooperative when given the 
opportunity, even if the punishment is costly for those the punishers. In addition, 
Charness and Grosskopf (2001) and Charness and Rabin (2002) examine the 
implications of relative consumption preferences. Specifically, Charness and 
Grosskopf (2001) use simple binary decisions and self-reported happiness to 
distinguish a person's desire to achieve the social optimum, equality, or an 
advantageous relative standing, but observe very little concern about relative payoffs 
in their experimental games. By designing a range of experimental games, Charness 
and Rabin (2002) show that individuals are more willing to increase social 
welfare—by sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially 
low-payoff recipients—than to reduce differences in payoffs. Individuals are also 
Aristotle defines envy as "the pain caused by the good fortune of others" (in Rhetoric, 1180b), while Kant 
(1797) defines it as "a reluctance to see our own well-being overshadowed by another's because the standard we 
use to see how well off we are is not the intrinsic worth of our own well-being but how it compares with that of 
others " Parrott and Smith (1993) define envy as an emotion that "occurs when a person lacks another's (perceived) 
superior quality, achievement, or possession and either desires it or wishes that the other lacked i t" 
24 
Robson (2001) assert the biological foundations of envy arise from evolution and that envy is tied with the 
preference of maximizing "reproductive success " 
" Adams (1963) founded the psychological foundations of envy by proposing a theory of inequity in terms of 
discrepancies between a man's job inputs and job outcomes and the behavior that can result from these 
discrepancies 
The sociological implications of envy are discussed by Elster (1991), who argues that when we observe another 
person's consumption, we tend to be more envious of those who are more similar to us Salovey and Rodin (1984) 
conducted a laboratory study and provide supportive evidence for the assertion 
2 "There is a significant literature in economics that has examined the implications of vanous forms of relative 
consumption preferences ( e g , Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin 
(2002)) Other papers use envy-based preferences to explain a variety of economic phenomena, such as emulative 
activity (Clark and Oswald (1998)), involuntary unemployment (Akerlof and Yellen (1990)), progressive taxation 
(Banerjee (1990)), wage compression (Frank (1984), Lazear (1989), Levine (1991)), suboptimal innovation (Mm 
(1995)), and intrafirm allocabonal distortions, such as corporate socialism in investment (Goel and Thakor (2005))" 
(Geol and Thakor (2010), p 489) 
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motivated by reciprocity but become unwilling to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome 
when others are unwilling to sacrifice, and will sometimes punish unfair behavior. 
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) study utility interdependence in the laboratory and 
find subjects will even burn the money of others at the cost of giving up some of their 
own cash. Moreover, many burners, especially disadvantaged ones, care about 
whether others "deserve" the money they have, where deservingness is not simply a 
matter of relative payoff. Cason and Mui (2002) provide evidence of the importance 
of psychological considerations in determining how distributional conflicts can 
prevent Pareto improving innovations. Potentially Pareto improving economic 
innovations are likely to be avoided when they benefit some people more than they do 
others. Overall, most economic studies find that individuals are averse to being worse 
off than others. 
"While the behavioral manifestations of envy are more sophisticated in adults, 
its presence does not seem to diminish with age" (Goel and Thakor (2005), p. 2255). 
Despite the fact that research on envy-related issues in economics has gained 
significant attention, envy has been relatively infrequently considered in corporate 
finance. Goel and Thakor (2005) develop a framework to model envy in corporate 
finance where agents exhibit envy-based preferences. That is, an envious agent's 
utility increases with his or her consumption and resources and decreases with that of 
others. The authors provide a new perspective on the nature of investment distortions 
with centralized and decentralized capital budgeting systems. They find that envy 
leads to corporate socialism when capital is centrally allocated, whereas decentralized 
capital budgeting leads to overinvestment. Thus, envy decreases firm value. 
Goel and Thakor's (2010) model assumes that the preferences of CEOs 
depend on both absolute and relative consumption—with relative consumption 
preferences characterized by envy—and shows that merger waves can arise even 
when the shocks that precipitated the initial mergers in the wave are idiosyncratic. 
Envy "induces a correlation in merger activities by making other CEOs in this cohort 
envious of the larger firm size and compensation now linked with the CEO of the firm 
that acquired first" (Goel and Thakor (2010), p. 490). The authors' analysis predicts 
and proves that the earlier acquisitions produce higher bidder returns, involve smaller 
targets, and result in higher compensation gains for the bidder's top management team 
than the later acquisitions in the wave. Consequently, Goel and Thakor (2010) view 
envy as the key driving force behind merger waves. 
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Table 2.1 shows that annual U.S. bank merger activity increased tremendously 
in 1993, from 96 to 161 deals, and remained high till 2000. The merger wave began 
before the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, passed by 
the Congress on September 29, 1994, which allowed interstate branching and is often 
cited as important evidence of deregulation (Cho (2010), Jones and Critchfield 
(2005)). Harford (2005) documents that economic, regulatory, and technological 
shocks, together with the availability of sufficient capital market liquidity, drive 
industry merger waves. This leaves open the question of what might cause a merger 
wave if the precipitating shock is neither market mispricing nor industrial shock but is 
just idiosyncratic to a few firms (Goel and Thakor (2010)). 
Moreover, bank mergers are likely to have occurred as a result of the 
dismantling of interstate branching restrictions, which facilitates the pursuit of scale 
economies (Lambrecht (2004)). However, some empirical evidence (Berger and 
Hannan (1989, 1992), Berger (1995)) contradicts this efficiency-based interpretation 
and shows that concentration leads to unfavorable prices for customers. Chapter II 
also shows that geographic and activity diversification decreases bidder wealth, as 
reflected in their negative abnormal returns around the merger announcement, which 
is consistent with the evidence of DeLong (2001) that further negates the assumption 
of scale economies. 
This study investigates whether envy contributes to the formation of U.S. 
banking merger waves. We adopt the concept of clusteredness from Harford (2005) 
and Yan (2009)29 and use the detrending method of Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain 
(2009) to define bank merger waves. The main conjecture is developed based on the 
theory of Geol and Thakor (2010); specifically, their three empirical predictions, 
concerning target size, announcement returns, and compensation increase, are retested 
in the banking context. Another two hypotheses, with respect to bidder size and 
synergy, are developed and supported with evidence. Finally, the long-term value 
creation of bidders is also tested. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether 
the envious psychology of bank managers causes the clusteredness of bank mergers. 
28 We also checked the number of all U.S banking mergers bids dunng 1980-2006, including both successful and 
unsuccessful deals (see Appendix C). We found that bank merger activity increased as early as 1990, and some 
merger-clustered months are also found in 1986 and 1987 
Yan (2009) particularly addresses the issue of bidders' worse post-merger performance in horizontal mergers 
The author presents a model to explain why value-maximizing firms conduct mergers that appear to lower 
shareholder value by incorporating imperfect product market competition into the standard neoclassical framework, 
which assumes value maximization and market efficiency. 
105 
Essay III is organized as follows Section II develops our hypotheses based on 
related literature Section III describes the methodology and data Section IV reports 
the empirical results Section V summarizes our findings and offers conclusions 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
What do CEOs envy? Bliss and Rosen (2001) investigate the effect of bank 
mergers on executive compensation during 1986-1995 and find acquisitions 
significantly increase CEO compensation, even after the typical announcement date 
stock price decline is subtracted from subsequent salary gains This CEO 
compensation is hardwired to firm size, and acquisition is an easy way to rapidly 
increase it The preferences of CEOs are based on both absolute and relative 
consumption, with relative consumption preferences characterized by envy (Goel and 
Thakor (2010)) Apart from increasing their compensation through firm growth, 
managers are likely to serve their private interests in various ways, such as increasing 
the resources under their control, boosting their prestige (Stulz (1990)), decreasing 
their unemployment risk, creating additional middle manager promotions, and making 
managers more indispensable to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)) Motivations 
for constructing "empires" apparently reflect executives' hunger for status, power, 
compensation, and prestige (Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), Williamson (1974), 
Jensen (1986)) All of these benefits obtained by mergers can increase a CEO's utility 
and incur the envy of other CEOs 
Therefore, firm size, or market capitalization, is a good proxy for managerial 
envy-based preferences, that is, a bank CEO always envies another CEO working in a 
bigger bank A CEO's utility increases with the difference between his or her firm 
size-based benefits (especially consumption) and those of the envied CEO 
4.2.1 Early versus Late Bidders 
The mam conjecture of this essay is that envy-based preferences are 
responsible for why bank mergers come in waves Since CEOs envy each other based 
on relative benefits and the CEOs of bigger firms get paid more, a merger in the 
industry that increases bank size for one CEO will tempt other envious CEOs to 
undertake size-enhancing instead of value-enhancing acquisitions, thereby starting a 
merger wave 
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In the model of Goel and Thakor (2010), the wave starts with a CEO of a firm 
within a size cohort receiving a possibly idiosyncratic shock that justifies an 
acquisition. The acquisition leads to increased firm size and CEO benefits. As Goel 
and Thakor (2010, p. 489) state, 
In the absence of envy, the story would end right here if the shock is 
purely idiosyncratic. Envy, however, induces a correlation in merger 
activities by making other CEOs in this cohort envious of the larger 
firm ... and linked with the CEO of the firm that acquired first.. 
Since a person envies others who are closet, a CEO envies those CEOs who 
are in the same cohort or reference group. Following Goel and Thakor (2010), we 
assume all bidders are initially of the same size in each wave, so that the CEOs of 
early bidding banks are in the same reference group as the late bidders. Consequently, 
early acquisition bidders are expected to have the same market value as late 
acquisition bidders, which leads to our first hypothesis. 
HI: A bidding firm in an early acquisition has the same market value as a bidder in a 
late acquisition. 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that if the early bidders are smaller than the 
late ones, acquisitions are less likely to boost their market value, and thus less prone 
to eliciting envy-based merger motivations from later bidders. Therefore, merger 
waves are less likely when the early bidders are smaller than the later bidders. 
4.2.2 Early versus Late Target (Transaction) 
If you are a bidder, which target firm would you prefer, the smaller or the 
bigger one? Literature shows smaller firms are more attractive to bidders, for two 
main reasons. First, the performance literature indicates that small firms have average 
or superior performance, and that large firms typically take over smaller firms (Levy 
(1993)). The better performance of small firms can be explained by their incentive 
structure, shorter decision lags, lower wages, and higher individual risk, or premia 
(Aiginger and Tichy (1991)). The faster growth of small firms in the 1980s "was 
fostered by diversification of demand, miniaturization of technology, and a need for 
flexibility under uncertainty" (Aiginger and Tichy (1991), p. 83). 
Second, acquiring small firms incurs smaller integration costs and therefore 
higher firm values are attainable for the bidders. Changes in CEO compensation after 
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mergers are positively related to anticipated gains from mergers, and other changes in 
the compensation structure are hardwired to managerial productivity (Anderson, 
Becher, and Campbell (2004)). It is natural to assume that the CEO's utility gain from 
an acquisition increases with the bidder's value gain from the acquisition but 
decreases with the size of the target because of the disutility of post-acquisition 
integration costs imposed by larger targets (Goel and Thakor (2010)). 
Therefore, we postulate that the CEO of an acquiring firm prefers a smaller 
target and one with greater value gain to the bidder. Since small targets are associated 
with higher value gains, they are expected to be acquired earlier in a merger wave. 
Larger targets that are not initially acquired are likely to be acquired by more envious 
CEOs in a later stage of the merger wave, when the utility gains of increased 
compensation from acquiring a bigger target are sufficient to "overcome the higher 
utility loss associated with integrating a larger target" (Goel and Thakor (2010), p. 
499). The previous discussion leads to the following hypotheses. 
H2a: Target firms in early acquisitions have a smaller market size than those in late 
acquisitions. 
H2b: The transaction size, both actual and relative, of early acquisitions is smaller 
than that of late acquisitions. 
4.2.3 Early versus Late Bidder Performance 
Thus far we have discussed that early bidders, compared with bidders in the late 
stages of merger waves, are more likely to benefit more from their acquisitions. 
Therefore, these gains will be reflected on both the early bidders' financial book and 
stock market values. 
H3: Early acquisition bidders experience superior performance compared to late 
acquisition bidders. 
We test this conjecture by examining bidding firms' short-run stock performance 
using three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) CAR(-1, +1) and long-run stock 
performance using 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
BHAR(+1, +12).30 This test allows us to see whether the market's initial reaction is 
As in Essay I, CARs and BHARs are calculated using the market model. When CARs and BHARs are 
calculated using the Fama-French three-factor model, we find similar results 
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consistent with the bidders' long-run stock performance. We also analyze long-run 
fundamental performance using the one-year abnormal return on assets (AROA)3' of 
bidders to test whether it is consistent with the stock performance results. 
4.2.4. Early versus Late Synergy 
At the early stage of the merger wave, there is less competition and more 
target options are available to bidders. Hence, early bidders are more likely to pick 
those targets that bring them higher merger gains. Consequently, we conjecture that 
early acquisitions are more likely to be associated with greater synergies. 
H4: Synergies are greater in early acquisitions than in late acquisitions. 
Value changes on the stock market around announcements can be viewed as expected 
gains from organizational efficiencies, product and geographic diversification, cost 
savings, and revenue enhancements (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; DeLong, 2001; 
Houston, James, and Ryngaert, 2001). Following Anderson, Becher, and Campbell 
(2004), we measure the expected gains, or synergy, from a merger as the 
value-weighted change in the market values of the target and bidder banks upon the 
merger announcement, and find that changes in CEO compensation after mergers are 
positively related to expected merger gains. 
4.2.5. Compensation Changes of Top Management: Early versus Late Bidders 
Our analysis predicts that the envy-induced sequential merger decisions of 
banks will lead to gains from mergers that depend on their timing within the wave. 
Specifically, the greater synergies of early bidders will lead to higher compensation 
increases for top managers, who are responsible for the merger decisions. This, then, 
yields the fifth hypothesis. 
H5: The increase in the total compensation of the acquiring firm's CEO and top 
management team is higher in earlier acquisitions than in later acquisitions. 
Mergers typically take shape through the efforts of the entire top management team, 
who is responsible for the deal-shaping process and experiences an increase in total 
We use the one-year AROA to analyze bidders' long-run fundamental performance. Our construction of the 
AROA is inspired by Bouwman, Fuller, and Nam (2009), who use abnormal return on operating income to analyze 
bidders' long-run operating performance. Specifically, we first extract the return on assets (ROA) of each bidder 
from one year before to one year after the merger completion. Then, we exclude the year of merger completion and 
use the ROA of the year after the deal minus the ROA of the year before the deal The difference obtained is the 
AROA, which we use to compare pre- and post-acquisition performance. 
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compensation from the synergy gains due to the acquisition. Therefore, as in Goel and 
Thakor (2010), we examine the increase in the total compensation of the top 
management team rather than that of just the CEO. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Measuring Waves 
Harford (2005) classifies an industry as undergoing a merger wave if, during a 
two-year window, the industry experiences its highest 24-month concentration of 
merger bids that decade, exceeding the 95th percentile of the simulated distribution. 
Yan (2009) identifies waves using the concentration, or clusteredness, of 
contemporaneous same-industry mergers and acquisitions activity. The author 
calculates the seven-month (three months prior to three months after the 
announcement month) number of horizontal mergers in the same industry and 
normalizes this number by the total number of mergers in that industry to measure 
clusteredness. 
Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) and Goel and Thakor (2010) classify a 
month as a merger wave month based on the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) of the 
Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 and the market-to-book ratio (M/B) of the overall stock 
market.33 Specifically, they "detrend the market P/E by removing the best 
straight-line fit from the P/E of the month in question and the five preceding years" 
(Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009), p. 639). If the detrended market P/E of that 
month is above (below) this past five-year average, it is categorized as above (below) 
average and the above-average months are then classified as high-valuation 
(low-valuation) markets. 4 
Since this study concentrates on the banking industry, the market P/E and M/B 
may not appropriately describe the valuation condition of a single industry.35 Instead 
Harford (2005) calculates the highest 24-month concentration of mergers for each industry and identifies two 
24-month merger waves for the bank industry, one beginning in August 1985 and the other in October 1996 
The literature shows more stock return dispersion in bullish markets than bear markets (Ang and Chen (2002), 
Hong, Tu, and Zhou (2007)), that is, correlations between U S stocks and the aggregate U S market are much 
greater for downside moves than for upside moves As Goel and Thakor (2010) claim, this disparity in stock 
movement make it easier for bidders to acquire in a bull market 
34 Goel and Thakor (2010) define high- and low-valuation markets as merger wave months and treat each month 
as a separate wave We contend that merger clusteredness is continuous and that it is more appropriate to treat 
continuous wave months as a single wave 
35 We also check the availability of the P/E of the S&P 500 banking subgroup and find that it is not available until 
1994 Because the Global Industry Classification Standard was not introduced until the 1990s and this industry 
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of using the monthly P/E, we directly use the monthly number of mergers to describe 
merger clusteredness. Following Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009), we detrend the 
monthly number of mergers and acquisitions by removing the best straight-line fit 
from t, the month in question, and the five preceding years. A month is categorized as 
above (below) average if the detrended number of mergers that month is positive 
(negative),36 which means the monthly volume of mergers is above (below) the 
five-year best straight-line fit (see Appendix C). Figure 4.1 plots the monthly merger 
bid volume in the U.S. banking industry from 1985 to 2006, as well as the detrended 
monthly merger volume. The months with positive detrended monthly mergers are 
defined as merger wave months, and continuous merger wave months are counted as a 
single merger wave. The graph shows wave months clustered in the late 1980s, the 
mid-1990s and 2000s, with the mid-1990s exhibiting the most salient merger activity. 
In our empirical analysis, each merger wave is evenly divided into 10's according to 
timeline. Early acquisitions are alternatively tested using the first 10%, 20%, 30%, 
40%, or 50%) of deals announced in each merger wave. 
4.3.2 Data Construction 
The original data on U.S. bank takeover bids are the same as in Essay I, 
obtained from the Thomson One Banker Database (SDC) for the period January 1985 
to December 2006 and originally including 2148 complete deals.37 Based on our 
wave classification, we only include deals meeting the following criteria: 
1. The bidder is a U.S. listed bank acquiring at least 50%> of the target bank's 
shares. 
2. The deal value exceeds $2 million. 
3. The deal was announced during the bank merger wave periods defined above. 
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for the number of early and late 
acquisitions announced during bank merger waves using our five alternative 
definitions of early acquisitions (the first 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50% of all deals 
announced during each merger wave in the timeline), based on our merger wave 
was not defined by S&P in the 1980s, we are unable to create a constituent list to calculate the P/E for this industry 
back in the 1980s 
36 We also use four other estimation penods (three months, six months, one year, and three years) to calculate the 
detrended monthly number of mergers. Our empirical results are robust to different classified waves. 
37 In these 2148 deals, the bidding firms' stocks are all traded on the New York Stock Exchange, Amencan Stock 
Exchange, or NASDAQ, with data from the Center for Research in Secunty Pnces available around the 
announcement (see Table I in Essay I). 
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classification method. The total number of qualified acquisitions announced during 
merger waves equals 598. 
To test the compensation changes for top managers, we retrieve the total 
compensation (item TDCl) of bidders from Compustat's ExecuComp database, which 
has data from 1992 to 2008. Total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual 
pay, the total value of restricted stock granted that year, the Black-Scholes value of 
stock options granted that year, long-term incentive payouts, and all other total 
compensations. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Early versus Late Bidders 
We first test whether bidders who announce acquisitions earlier during merger 
waves have similar market capitalization as bidders who announce acquisitions later. 
A difference-in-means test is used for this purpose. Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the 
difference in mean size of late and early bidders. The results clearly support the 
prediction of HI, which postulates that early bidders are not significantly different 
from late bidders in firm size. For example, if we define early acquisitions as the first 
10% of all acquisitions announced during merger waves and the remaining ones as 
late acquisitions, the mean market capitalization is $4.74 billion for early bidders and 
$3.09 billion for late bidders—not significantly bigger. If, instead, we define early 
acquisitions as the first 20%> to 50%>, the results remain insignificant based on bidder 
firm size. In sum, this result suggests that early bidders are more likely to motivate 
envy-based mergers by late bidders in an attempt to keep up with the increasing size 
change of their early bidding peers. 
4.4.2 Early versus Late Target (Transaction) 
Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the mean size of late and early targets. The 
prediction that early target banks are smaller than late target banks (H2a) is generally 
supported When we define early acquisitions as the first 20%> (30%>) of all 
acquisitions announced during merger waves, the mean market capitalization is 
$210,496 million ($229,166 million) for early targets, significantly smaller than for 
late targets, whose mean size is $636.06 million ($662,358 million). 
Panel B of Table 4.2 reports both the mean actual transaction size and relative 
transaction size of late and early acquisitions. Our prediction that the early transaction 
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value is smaller than the late transaction value (H2b) is better supported when the 
transaction value is measured by relative size. With all five alternative classifications 
of merger waves, the relative size of late deals is always significantly larger than that 
of early acquisitions, whereas the actual size of late acquisitions is tenuously larger 
than the early ones. For example, if we define early acquisitions as the first 10%, the 
actual size of late acquisitions is $170,748 million more than the actual size of early 
acquisitions, and the relative size of late deals is 6.513% larger than that of early 
acquisitions, which is statistically significant at 5%>. 
Overall, target banks in early acquisitions have smaller market capitalization 
than those in the late acquisitions, and early acquisition transactions are smaller than 
late acquisition transactions, especially when the transactions are measured by relative 
size. 
4.4.3 Early versus Late Bidder Performance 
Table 4.3 reports the bidders' mean three-day CARs, 12-month 
post-acquisition BHARs, and one-year AROAs. The prediction of our third hypothesis 
(H3), that early acquisition bidders experience superior performance relative to late 
acquisition bidders, gains stronger support in the long term than in the short term 
(weakly supported). With all five alternative classifications of merger waves, the 
CARs of early bidders are tenuously larger than those of late bidders. However, the 
BHARs of early bidders are significantly larger than those of late bidders when early 
acquisitions are defined as either the first 20% or the first 30%o of all acquisitions 
announced during merger waves. Similarly, the one-year AROA of early bidders is 
significantly larger than that of late bidders when early acquisitions are defined as 
either the first 40% or 50% of all acquisitions announced during merger waves. Thus, 
we can conclude that early bidders perform better than later bidders after acquisition 
completion. 
Table 4.4 provides multivariate regressions of short-term (CARs) and 
long-term (one-year BHARs and one-year AROAs) performance measures on Early 
Acquisition, controlling for other effects. Year fixed effects are controlled in all the 
multivariate regressions. Testing how bidder performance is related to Early 
Acquisition, we find that the Early Acquisition binary variable has a tenuous positive 
influence on three-day CARs and one-year AROAs. However, still eight out of the 10 
coefficients of Early Acquisition are tenuously positive, which is consistent with our 
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conjecture. The impact of Early Acquisition is ambiguous when we focus on one-year 
BHARs. Since the literature shows the average post-acquisition returns of bidders are 
negative, which is a salient feature of mergers since the 1980s (e.g., You, Caves, 
Smith, and Henry (1986), Varaiya and Ferris (1987), Byrd and Hickman (1992), 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)), the results of Table 4.4 show that early 
bidders perform fairly well. Overall, the multivariate results weakly support our third 
hypothesis concerning bidder performance in both the short term and long term. 
4.4.4 Early versus Late Synergy 
Consistent with the fourth hypothesis (H4), which conjectures that early 
acquisitions realize greater synergies than late acquisitions, Table 4.5 reports that 
early acquisitions, indeed, experience greater synergies than late ones. Specifically, in 
five alternative regressions, the coefficients of Early Acquisition are all significantly 
positive, showing the stock market expects higher gains from deals in the early stage 
of waves. This is consistent with the conjecture that the CEOs of early bidders are 
likely to gain more private benefits than the CEOs of late bidders, so the CEOs of 
other banks in the same cohort become more envious and make acquisitions even 
when synergy is low. 
4.4.5 Compensation Changes of Top Management: Early versus Late Bidders 
To test our last hypothesis (H5), which predicts that the increase in the total 
compensation of the CEO and top management team of acquiring banks is higher in 
earlier acquisitions than in later acquisitions, we calculate the average total 
compensation of the bidder's top management team in the year before the acquisition 
announcement and two years after the announcement, and test the percentage increase 
in mean total compensation. Panel A of Table 4.6 repots the mean percentage change 
in the top management compensation of early and late bidders. Specifically, with three 
out of five alternatives, the early bidders experience significantly greater increases in 
compensation than the late bidders. 
Furthermore, we regress compensation changes and synergies of acquisitions 
announced in merger waves on an early acquisition dummy and control variables. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Multivariate results from Panel B of Table 4.6 
also provide evidence consistent with our conjecture that the increase in top 
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management compensation is greater for deals announced earlier in a wave than for 
those announced later. Controlling for relative deal size and payment method, the 
coefficients of Early Acquisition are significantly positive in three out of five 
regressions. 
In sum, our final hypothesis, that compensation increases are higher in earlier 
acquisitions than in later acquisitions, is supported by the data. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The literature shows that envy is deeply rooted in human nature and everyone 
wants to "keep up with the Joneses." We conjecture that the envious psychology of 
bank CEOs will affect their investment decisions; specifically, they become envious 
and rush into acquisitions once other CEOs in their group initiate one. In this way, 
acquisitions correlate with each other, and merger waves come into being. 
Five empirical predictions are put forward and generally supported with 
evidence. Specifically, the market capitalization of bidders that acquire banks during 
the early phases of merger waves is not significantly different from that of bidders 
that acquire target banks later. The target banks in earlier acquisitions in a merger 
wave are smaller than those in later acquisitions in the wave, and the transaction value 
of the earlier deals is smaller than that of the later deals. In addition, the earlier 
mergers in a wave have slightly higher bidder returns than later mergers, as well as 
significantly larger BHARs and increases in ROA. Moreover, earlier acquisitions in a 
merger wave lead to greater increases in top management compensation than later 
acquisitions, and display significantly higher synergies. 
Overall, our analysis provides evidence for the main conjecture that envy 
among bank CEOs can generate bank merger waves even when the economic shock 
that initiates the wave is purely idiosyncratic to the first firm in the wave. We view 
envy as a key driving force behind bank merger waves. 
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Appendix C 
Statistics for U.S. Banking Merger Bids during 1980-2006 
This table reports the monthly number of merger bids m the U S banking industry during 1980-2006 and the 
five-year detrended number of monthly mergers during 1986-2006 Each number of monthly mergers is detrended 
by removing the best straight-line fit from t, the month in question, and the five preceding years 
Date 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary Statistics on Early versus Late Acquisitions in Merger Waves 
This table reports the number of early and late acquisitions announced during merger wave under five alternative 
definitions of Early Acquisitions The sample penod is from January 1985 to December 2006 
Each month from Jan 1985 to Dec 2006 is classified as a merger wave month if the detrended monthly volume of 
mergers is positive (refer to Appendix C) The continuous merger wave months are counted as one merger wave 
Each merger wave is evenly divided into tens according to timeline Early acquisitions are the first 10%, 20%, 
30%, 40%, or 50% of deals announced in each merger wave The remaining deals are classified as late 
acquisitions 
Percentage of deals classified as early acquisitions 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
Number of deals 
Early acquisitions 67 124 180 223 274 
Late acquisitions 531 474 418 375 324 
All acquisitions 598 598 598 598 598 
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Table 4.2 
Bidder (Target) Size and Transaction Value of Bidders 
This table reports market capitalization (size) of late and early bidders/targets (Panel A), actual deal size and 
relative deal size of late and early acquisitions (Panel B), CAR(-1, +1), BHAR(+1, +12) and 1Y - AROAfor late 
and early bidders (Panel C), as well as the differences between groups ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
Panel A: Changes of Bidder (Target) Size: Early Acquisitions vs. Late Acquisitions 
Panel A reports the mean size of late and early bidders/targets, as well as the difference of two groups The mean 





Percentage of Deals Classified as Early 
Acquisitions 
Mean Size of Early Bidders 
Mean Size of Late Bidders 
Difference (2)-(1) 
t-value 
Mean Size of Early Targets 
Mean Size of Late Targets 
Difference (4)-(3) 
t-value 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
4739 955 4803 524 3467 027 3413 489 3710 479 
3085 086 3068 364 3214 224 3199 433 2962 457 
-1654 869 -1735 16 -252 803 -214 056 -748 022 
[-0 704] [-1021] [-0210] [-0194] [-0729] 
391216 210 496 229 166 462 617 461777 
585 331 636 06 662 358 620 116 646 515 
194 115 425 564* 433 192* 157 499 184 738 
[0 581] [1825] [1893] [0 678] [0 752] 
Panel B: Changes of Transaction Deal Values: Early Acquisitions vs. Late Acquisitions 
Panel B reports the mean actual deal size and mean relative deal size of late and early acquisitions, as well as the 
difference of two groups The actual deal value is measured in $ million Relative transaction size is defined as the 






Percentage of Deals Classified as Early 
Acquisitions 
Actual Deal Size for Early Acquisitions 
Actual Deal Size for late Acquisitions 
Difference (2)-(1) 
t-value 
Relative Deal Size for Early Acquisitions 
Relative Deal Size for Late Acquisitions 
Difference (4) - (3) 
t-value 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
165 748 303 489 24131 23123 251406 
336 496 320 996 350 116 368 588 373 146 
170 748 17 507 108 806 137 358 12174 
[1151] [0084] [0619] [0797] [0 700] 
12 271% 14 266% 13 221% 14 544% 14 461% 
18 784% 19 042% 20 010% 20 009% 20 831 % 
6 513%** 4 776%* 6 789%*** 5 465%** 6 370%*** 
[2 093] [19221 [2 961] [2 392] [2 723] 
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Table 4.3 
Performance of Bidders: Early Acquisitions vs. Late Acquisitions 
This table reports the mean CAR(-1, +1), BHAR(+1 +12) and / Y - AROA for late and early bidders, as well as the 
difference of two groups CAR(-1, +1) is the bidders' 3-day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement 
BHAR(+1, +12) is the bidders'12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns after the announcement 1Y - AROA is 
the bidders' 1 year abnormal return-on-assets after the announcement ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 







Percentage of Deals Classified as Early 
Acquisitions 
CAR(-1, +1) for Early Bidders 
CAR(-1, +1) for Late Bidders 
Difference (2)-(1) 
t-value 
BHAR(+1, +12) for Early Bidders 
BHAR(+1, +12) for Late Bidders 
Difference (4) - (3) 
t-value 
1Y - AROA for Early Bidders 
1Y - AROA for Late Bidders 
Difference (6) - (5) 
t-value 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
-0 310% -0 108% -0 049% -0 252% -0 429% 
-0 520% -0 598% -0 689% -0 642% -0 553% 
-0 210% -0 490% -0 640%* -0 390% -0 124% 
[-0 572] [-1231] [-1695] [-1080] [-0 350] 
-9 105% -4 319% -6 449% -7 705% -9 155% 
-9 493% -10 796% -10 742% -10 494% -9 702% 
-0 388% -6 477%** -4 293%* -2 789% -0 547% 
[-0 194] [-2 411] [-1696] [-1143] [-0 227] 
0 078% 0 044% 0 041% 0055% 0064% 
-0 013% -0 014% -0 022% -0 036% -0 054% 
-0 09% -0 06% -0 06% -0 091%** -0 118%*** 
[-1093] [-1066] [-1380] [-2 059] [-2 706] 
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Table 4.4 
OLS Regressions CARs, BHARs and AROAs 
This table reports ordinary least square regression results We regress three-day CARs, 1-year BHARs, 
and 1Y-AROAs of acquisitions announced in merger waves on an early acquisition dummy and control 
variables All regressions include year fixed effects Early acquisition is a dummy variable, which equals to 
1 if the acquisition happened in the first 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50% in the merger wave, and equals 
to 0 otherwise 
Control variables include Relative Size—the transaction value divided by the market value of equity of 
the bidder at one month prior to the acquisition announcement, Stock—a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the acquisition was paid for in stock, Friend—a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquisition was a 
friendly offer CAR(-1, +1) is the bidders' 3-day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement 
BHAR(+1, +12) is the bidders'l 2-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns after the announcement 1Y - AROA is 
the bidders' 1 year abnormal return-on-assets after the announcement 
Numbers in parentheses are /-statistics ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively 
Panel A: Regression on CAR 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage of Deals Classified 
















































































Table 4.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression on BHAR 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage of Deals Classified 























Panel C: Regression on AROA 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage of Deals Classified 





































































































































OLS Regressions on Synergies 
This table reports ordinary least square regression results We regress synergies and compensation changes of 
acquisitions announced in merger waves on an early acquisition dummy and control variables. All regressions 
include year fixed effects. Early acquisition is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the acquisition happened in 
the first 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50% in the merger wave, and equals to 0 otherwise 
Control variables include: Relative Size—the transaction value divided by the market value of equity of the bidder 
at one month prior to the acquisition announcement; Stock—a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquisition was 
paid for in stock, Fnend—a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquisition was a friendly offer 2Y Comp-Change 
equals to the "total compensation" of the top management 2-year after the merger announcement over that of the 
year before the announcement minus 1. Synergy f-1,+1] is defined as weighted sum (by market capitalization) of 
the bidder and target cumulative abnormal announcement returns following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). 
Synergy f-1,+1] equals to ($ACAR[-1,+1] + $TCAR[-1,+ 1]) / (BidderMCAP[-2] + (1- Toehold) x 
TargetMCAP[-2]). $ACAR[-1,+ 1] refers to change of bidding bank stockholders' wealth; $TCAR[-1,+1] refers to 
change of target bank stockholders' wealth during window [-1.+ 1], (BidderMCAP[-2] + (1- Toehold) x 
TargetMCAP[-2]) refers to the combined market value of bidder and target. 
Numbers in parentheses are ^-statistics ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage of Deals Classified 


















































































Compensation of Top Management: Early Bidders vs. Late Bidders 
This table reports the results concerning the compensation of top management, for the bidders Panel A 
shows the univariate tests, Panel B shows the multivariate tests 2Y Comp-Change equals to the "total 
compensation" of the top management 2-year after the merger announcement over that of the year before the 
announcement minus 1 
Numbers in parentheses are (-statistics ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively 
Panel A: Compensation Change of Bidders: Early Acquisitions vs. Late Acquisitions 
Panel A reports the mean increase in top management compensation of early and late acquisitions, as well as the 
difference of two groups 
(1) 
(2) 
Percentage of Deals Classified as Early 
Acquisitions 
Mean 2Y Comp-Change of Early Bidders 
Mean 2Y Comp-Change of Late Bidders 
Difference (2)-(1) 
t-value 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
143 64% 102 95% 99 22% 11130% 108 57% 
71 27% 76 93% 73 83% 59 06% 57 66% 
-72 37%* -26 02% -25 39% -52 25%** -50 92%** 
[-1 661] [-0 837] [-0 976] [-2 044] [-2 039] 
Panel B: Regression on Compensation Increase 
Panel B reports ordinary least square regression results We regress compensation changes of 
acquisitions announced in merger waves on an early acquisition dummy and control variables All 
regressions include year fixed effects Early acquisition is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the 
acquisition happened in the first 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50% in the merger wave, and equals to 0 
otherwise 
Control variables include Relative Size—the transaction value divided by the market value of equity of 
the bidder at one month prior to the acquisition announcement, Stock—a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the acquisition was paid for in stock, Friend—a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquisition was a 
friendly offer 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage of Deals Classified 


















































































Time Series of (Detrended) Monthly Merger Bids 
This figure plots the monthly merger bid volume in the U S. banking industry from 1985 to 2006. The numbers 
correspond to Appendix C. The dashed line shows the monthly volume of merger bids, and the solid line shows the 
5-year detrended monthly merger activity. The months with positive detrended monthly mergers are defined as 
merger wave months 
160 r 
-60 L 
^ ^ ^ — 5Y Detrended Monthly Mergers — — — # of Monthly Mergers 
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